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ABSTRACT
Using a Three-Dimensional Model to Understand Age Differences in the Framing Effect
Tara E. Karns, M.S.
The present study used a between-subjects design with three instruction conditions to investigate
susceptibility to the framing effect among younger, middle-aged, and older adults. Participants
were instructed to pay attention to the facts and numbers, to use their gut feelings, or to use their
previous experiences to respond to two decision-making scenarios pertaining to treatment for
lung cancer and a vaccination for a flu virus. Results revealed that, overall, the framing effect
was present in the lung cancer scenario, but not the flu scenario. Instruction condition and age
did not affect susceptibility to the framing effect; however, a frame by condition was identified
for older adults in a flu scenario. The short-term survival information was more important to
participants in the survival frame of the lung cancer scenario. Numeracy was not a significant
predictor of the framing effect. Previous research has demonstrated mixed results concerning age
differences in the framing effect. The current study further supports that there is no age
difference in susceptibility to the framing effect and susceptibility may not be determined by the
type of information that is used when making a decision.
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Using a Three-Dimensional Model to Understand Age Differences in the Framing Effect
The framing effect is the tendency for people to make different and potentially less
optimal decisions depending on how the decision options are “framed” or structured (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981; see Strough, Karns, & Schlosnagle, 2011 for a review). Despite the differences
in frames, whether they are structured as positive or negative, gains or losses, or even survival
vs. mortality, in a rational decision, the frame of the decision options should not change the
decision outcome. The framing effect has been demonstrated in domains such as medical
decisions (e.g., McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, 1982), financial decisions (e.g., Mayhorn,
Fiske, & Whittle, 2002), and most prominently in the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
using the classic “Asian Disease paradigm” (see Kühberger, 1998 for a review). The Asian
disease situation requires participants to make a decision based on the number of lives saved
(i.e., 200 people out of a total of 600 people will be saved) in the positive frame or the number of
lives lost (i.e., 400 people out of a total of 600 people will die) in the negative frame. A close
look at the number of lives saved vs. lost indicates that the same number of people will live or
die in both situations. Despite this, people often make different decisions. The framing effect is
especially relevant in medical situations where people are required to make decisions based on
complex circumstances and numerical information involving short- and long-term outcomes.
In the current study, the framing effect in medical decision situations was examined
among younger, middle-aged, and older adults using a recently proposed conceptual threedimensional decision-making framework comprised of a deliberative, experiential, and affective
condition (Strough et al., 2011). In addition, the influence of short- vs. long-term information on
medical decisions was examined. Objective numeracy – participants’ ability to utilize and
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understand numerical information (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009) – was used as a
control variable to further inform possible explanations for the framing effect.
Measuring the Framing Effect
Stimuli
The framing effect has been examined in adults by using various different tasks ranging
from computer-based tasks (e.g., Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011), concrete tasks such as the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; see Lejuez et al., 2002) and the Cups task (see Levin,
Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007), and hypothetical vignettes (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982;
Woodhead, Lynch, & Edelstein, 2011) and gain vs. loss monetary situations (e.g., Thomas &
Millar, 2012). The hypothetical vignettes range from business (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986)
and gambling scenarios (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to medical (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982),
and social situations (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986). In the hypothetical vignettes, participants
choose between a “sure thing” vs. a “risky” option and participants do not usually receive any
sort of substantial reward or loss for making their decisions. The Asian Disease paradigm is one
such example of a hypothetical vignette.
In the current study, hypothetical medical vignettes were used. Medical decision
situations are important to examine due to their complexity and possible life-changing
implications. Although previous literature has used a variety of different types of vignettes, the
current study used the lung cancer scenario developed by McNeil et al. (1982) in addition to a
modified version of that vignette about getting the flu. Using a previously established vignette
addresses issues in the framing effect literature (addressed later) and adds more cohesion to a
body of literature that has many inconsistencies.
Measurement
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Between- vs. within-subjects design. Frame (i.e., survival vs. mortality) has been used
as both a between- and a within-subjects factor (e.g., Woodhead et al., 2011). Stanovich and
West (2008), explain that differences in associations between the framing effect and individual
differences in within- vs. between-subjects framing effect studies may occur. In a withinsubjects study, participants recognize the inconsistencies in the vignettes when they are given the
same situation (with slight numerical differences) more than once. Participants in a betweensubjects study see the decision situation only once so they do not recognize a consistency issue.
However, as Stanovich and West (2008) explain, this may result in a lack of associations
between the framing effect and individual differences in between-subjects studies. Despite
differences in consistency in between- and within-subjects designs, Woodhead et al. (2011)
identified similar framing patterns in their between- and within-subjects studies. They gave the
participants both frames (i.e., survival vs. mortality for lung cancer) of the decision-making
scenarios in Study 1, while in Study 2, the participants were given only one frame (i.e., survival
or mortality). Results revealed similar trends in the framing effect in both studies using frame as
a predictor of decision choice. That is, in the survival frame, people had a tendency to choose the
option with higher short-term risks (i.e., surgery) more frequently than in the mortality frame. As
a result, people were more risk averse in the survival frame and risk seeking in the mortality
frame. A between-subjects design in which each participant saw only one vignette of each pair of
vignettes (i.e., cancer and flu) was used in the current study.
Types of framing. In tasks involving a choice between a sure thing or a risky option, the
choices made in the gain vs. loss frames are compared to measure the framing effect. The type of
framing effect that is identified using this comparison is called standard framing (Reyna & Ellis,
1994). That is, participants have a tendency to be risk seeking in loss (negative) frames but risk
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averse in gain (positive) frames. Preference reversal, or preference shift, is measured by using
data that is collected across trials (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People are more likely to take a
gamble for a potential good outcome in gain frames but are more likely to choose an option
which results in a sure thing in loss frames (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). For example,
preference reversal, or shift, would be measured by examining the number of times that a
participant chooses the sure thing in the gain frame and the risky choice in the loss frame.
In addition to traditional types of framing effects, resistance to framing has also been
examined (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). Resistance to framing is a measure
of how resistant people are to demonstrating the framing effect. The resistance to framing
measure is comprised of “risky choice framing” and “attribute framing” items. Risky choice
framing is presented as a single scale with the safe choice (or sure thing) presented at one end of
the scale and the risky choice at the other end. Attribute framing refers to situations structured
positively and negatively. In this type of measurement, each decision scenario is presented twice,
framed either as a gain vs. a loss (risky-choice framing) or as a positive vs. a negative (attribute
framing). For the attribute items, the person does not indicate a difference between two options
but rather evaluates a quality of the item, such as the amount of fat in ground beef. In the current
study, resistance to framing was measured using the attribute framing subscale of the Resistance
to Framing scale (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). The Resistance to Framing measure (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007) was used to ensure that the participants exhibit similar levels of resistance to
framing at the start of the study.
Explanations for the Framing Effect
Affect Heuristic
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Kahneman and Frederick (2007) examined neuroimaging data collected by DeMartino,
Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) and concluded that the framing effect occurs as the result
of the use of an affective heuristic. An affective heuristic is a mental shortcut that uses emotion
assigned to representations of objects and events in people’s minds (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic,
& Johnson, 2000). Finucane et al. (2000) describes decision making using the affect heuristic as
a process that requires the decision maker to consult an affective pool. The affective pool
contains all of the positive and negative emotions associated with the representations. When a
decision has to be made, the affect heuristic is activated. The person unconsciously consults their
affective pool for the emotional marker that is assigned to that particular representation and uses
that marker to help make their decision.
In terms of gains and losses, use of an affective heuristic causes decision makers to
recognize sure gains as attractive and losses as aversive. As a result, decision makers are thought
to demonstrate the standard framing effect, risk seeking in loss frames, but risk averse in gain
frames (Cassotti et al., 2012). Cassotti et al.’s (2012) results are also consistent with the
existence of an affective heuristic. After participants experienced a positive emotional
manipulation, their susceptibility to the framing effect was eliminated. Particularly, positive
emotion reduced loss aversion, limiting participants’ tendency to exhibit risk taking in loss
frames, but it did not influence risk-taking behavior overall. However, susceptibility to the
framing effect was not reduced or increased after a negative emotion manipulation. Cheung and
Mikels (2011) also identified positive affect as being associated with risk-seeking in loss frames.
However, in gain frames, positive affect was not related to risk aversion. In addition, DeMartino
et al. (2006) identified a significant association between the framing effect and the amygdala,
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signifying an affective contribution. These findings provide further support that the framing
effect may occur as a result of an affective heuristic that occurs during an affective process.
To investigate whether affect influences susceptibility to the framing effect, in the current
study, participants were assigned to one of four instruction conditions: affective, experiential,
deliberative, or control. Participants assigned to the affective condition were instructed to use
their intuition and gut feelings to make their decision, which was hypothesized to result in an
increased susceptibility to the framing effect. Because participants were instructed to pay
attention to their affect, it was hypothesized that they would be likely to make their decisions
based on negative affect in the mortality frame and positive affect in the survival frame, resulting
in different decisions depending on the frame.
Fuzzy Trace Theory
More recently, Reyna advanced another explanation for the framing effect. Reyna (2004)
explains the decision-making process as being comprised of two representations: gist and
verbatim. Gist representations are easy to access and contain an overall representation of an idea.
However, they tend to be less exact, or “fuzzy,” in comparison to verbatim representations which
are the exact depiction of an idea. For example, when faced with the classic Asian Disease
paradigm, people who use gist processing may come to the conclusion that it is “better to save
some lives than none”. Fuzzy-trace theory also holds intuition as central. When people use gist
representations to make a decision, they are often relying on their “gut feeling” or their intuition
to guide the way.
Reyna and Brainerd (2011) concluded that the framing effect in adults is the result of the
tendency to use gist processing rather than verbatim processing. Rather than carefully analyzing
the details such as the numbers in a decision situation, people use the gist of the decision. As a
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result, in situations framed as losses, people focus on the gist of loss and in situations framed as
gains, people focus on the gist of gains. For example, when faced with the fatal disease situation
framed with two alternatives to choose from (i.e., saving some people; saving some people or
saving no one), people are more likely to choose the sure thing (i.e., saving some people).
However, when faced with the same situation framed as a loss with two alternatives to choose
from (i.e., some people die; some people die or none die), the same heuristic is being used (i.e.,
valuing human life) so people are more likely to choose the gamble (i.e., some people die or
none die). Gists, while efficient and sometimes resulting in rational decisions, prevent people
from analyzing all the details of the decision situation such as the odds and probabilities of a
disease occurring.
Prospect Theory
The framing effect has numerous explanations that span from individual differences to
biological explanations (see Strough et al., 2011 for a review). However, since the development
of prospect theory in 1981, it has become, perhaps, the most widely accepted theory for
explaining the occurrence of the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Within prospect
theory, outcomes are described as deviations from a neutral reference point. The deviations may
be positive or negative (or gains or losses) with the response to losses more extreme than the
response to gains. The value function is the term used to describe how a person’s response to
losses is more extreme than their response to gains. That is, the negative feelings that occur in
response to a monetary loss are more extreme than positive feelings associated with a monetary
gain of the same amount. When demonstrating the framing effect, people tend to respond using
value functions; that is, they tend to respond more strongly to losses than gains (e.g., lives lost
vs. lives saved). Loss aversion, which depicts potential losses as being more influential than
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potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), is another term for value function that has been
used frequently in the framing effect literature (Soman, 2004). In addition, there is a tendency to
overweight low probabilities and underweight larger probabilities, called the probability
weighting function. For example, people underweight a 2/3 (66%) chance of gaining $150, but
overweight a 1/3 (33%) chance of gaining $0 (Thomas & Millar, 2012).
In the current study, participants who were randomly assigned to the deliberative
condition (instructed to use the facts and figures) were hypothesized as being likely to exhibit
loss aversion; that is, losses are more influential than gains. Because paying attention to the facts
and figures highlights the number of people who die in the mortality frame (i.e., the loss), it was
hypothesized that participants would be more likely to demonstrate the framing effect in the
deliberative condition. That is, participants would be more likely to choose radiation in the
mortality frame (risk seeking) because paying attention to the facts and figures highlights the
number of people who die (i.e., the loss). Conversely, participants would be more likely to
choose surgery (risk aversive) in the survival frame.
Age Differences in the Framing Effect
The research examining the framing effect in younger and older adults has yielded
inconsistent results (see Strough et al., 2011 for a review). For example, Mata, Josef, SamanezLarkin, and Hertwig (2011) conducted a meta-analysis and identified younger and older adults as
exhibiting similar risk-taking behavior for most of the tasks they examined. However, Mata and
colleagues (2011) also identified an age difference in risk taking among younger and older adults
as a function of decreased learning performance. When learning led to risk-avoidant behaviors,
younger adults were more risk averse, but when learning led to risk-seeking behavior, older
adults were more risk averse.
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Furthermore, a study examining medical scenarios (i.e. the fatal disease problem and
decision situations involving cancer) revealed that older adults demonstrated the framing effect
while younger adults did not (Kim, Goldstein, Hasher, & Zacks, 2005). However, some previous
research using only younger adults has demonstrated that they exhibit susceptibility to the
framing effect (Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001) and in some cases, more susceptibility than
older adults (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982). Conversely, a study that used a computer-based task to
measure the framing effect found that the standard framing effect was more prevalent among
younger adults (Mikels & Reed, 2009).
Other research has found very little to no difference between younger and older adults in
susceptibility to the framing effect (Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, & Lindström, 2005).
It appears that when decision situations are framed in terms of risky choices, the adult age
difference is not strong. In a series of decisions on gains and losses, Rönnlund and colleagues
(2009) identified younger and older adults as equally affected by frames. That is, both younger
and older adults were more likely to choose the certain option in gain frames and the risky option
in loss frames. Similarly, Mayhorn, Fisk, and Whittle (2002) also found adults of all ages to be
equally susceptible to the framing effect. To date, no research has explicitly used middle-aged
adults as a comparison group to examine the framing effect across adulthood.
As demonstrated above, the previous research on age-related differences in the framing
effect is inconsistent. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint a trend across the adult lifespan. To
remedy some of the inconsistencies in the body of literature, the current study used younger,
middle-aged, and older adults and vignettes similar to those in previous research (i.e., McNeil et
al., 1982). To date, middle-aged adults have not been examined and using them as a separate age
group helped to solidify a trend in the framing effect across the adult lifespan.
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Dual-Process Decision-Making Theories
Judgment and decision making has been examined and explained in light of dual-process
models comprised of two processes or systems: affective/experiential (Type 1) and deliberative
(Type 2) systems (Kahneman, 2003; see Keren & Schul (2009) for a review of the different
names for each system). The process of making a decision using the affective/experiential
processing is quick, efficient, and requires less cognitive effort than the deliberative processing
due to its reliance on mental heuristics, affect, intuition, or experience, among others (Evans,
2008; Osman, 2004). The decision outcomes of the affective/experiential processing are more
susceptible to biases and often result in irrational decisions. Deliberative processing, on the other
hand, is more effortful and has a higher reliance on rules and formal operations and tends to be
more accurate than affective/experiential processing. A function of deliberative processing is to
monitor the affective/experiential processing, although intuitive judgments sometimes slip
through, creating flawed judgments (Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). Although several versions
of dual-process theories exist, most theories share some major commonalities such as the overall
functioning described above and an interaction effect, in which the processes overlap and work
together. Although the processes work independently they also overlap in some domains and this
overlap may result in conflicting responses to some situations (Osman, 2004).
Evans and Stanovich (2013) caution against referring to the two processes as systems due
to the term's tendency to suggest that there are exactly two systems responsible for the
processing. They suggest using the terms Type 1 and Type 2, which indicate that there are two
types of processing. In addition, they recommend using the term processing rather than systems.
This allows for the assumption that multiple cognitive systems may underlie the processing.
Evans and Stanovich (2013a) also make the distinction between modes and types, whereas modes
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are types of cognitive processing that occur within what is considered Type 2 thinking. Evans
and Stanovich (2013a) define Type 2 processing (i.e., deliberative processing for this purpose) as
"slow, sequential, and correlated with measures of general intelligence" (pg. 235). In addition,
Type 2 processing is unique to humans in that it allows for "hypothetical thinking, mental
simulation, and consequential decision making" (pg. 235). Type 1 processing (i.e.,
experiential/affective processing) requires minimal attention, lessening demands on working
memory. It is also mandatory when stimuli that trigger it are present. For example, the acquired
"waste not" heuristic. Although not necessary for Type 1 processing, execution has a tendency to
be quick, central processing load is light, and associative. However, these qualities are correlated
features and not required for a definition of Type 1 processing.
Critiques of Dual-Process Theories
Although research on dual-process theories is plentiful, the debate of the existence of
these processes rages on. For example, recently, Evans and Stanovich (2013a) examined five
common critiques of the dual-process theories. They highlight mistakes that others have made in
their critiques, and redefine the two processes. Despite this reexamination of the dual processes,
Osman (2013), Kruglanski (2013), Keren (2013), and Thompson (2013) reiterated their issues
with the dual-process theories and countered Evans and Stanovich's (2013a) explanations and
definitions.
That being said, dual-process theories can be helpful when trying to determine how a
person makes a decision, especially when attempting to explain how a particular decisionmaking bias or error occurs. However, the critiques that have been offered make it clear that
some issues with these models exist (e.g., Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski, 2013;
Osman, 2013; Strough et al., 2011; Thompson, 2013). These critiques have challenged previous
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research which often distinguishes between the two systems, making them appear independent
(Keren & Schul, 2009). Keren and Schul (2009) cite inconsistent definitions of the two systems,
faults in the previous research that describe the systems as separate, and undetermined isolability
as evidence that the dual-process theories need to be redefined. Isolability is described as each
system working independently to perform its designated tasks, with no reliance on the other
system. To account for some of these issues, the three-dimensional model proposed by Strough
et al. (2011) of a three-dimensional decision-making process was used in the current study.
Commentary on Evans and Stanovich's (2013a) review of critiques argue that Type 2
processes may also be triggered automatically (Thompson, 2013) and the completion of Type 2
processes require working memory and are more flexible than Type 1 processes. For example, if
a decision outcome is not one of serious consequences, a decision maker may disregard any
additional thought even though they are not completely satisfied with their decision. Kruglanski
(2013) argues that even though Evans and Stanovich (2013a) define the model as a dual-process
default-interventionist model, it appears to be more unimodal. That is, Evans and Stanovich
(2013a) describe Type 1 processing as being overridden by Type 2 processing when confidence
is lacking in the judgment or when the cognitive ability is absent to reason about a judgment.
This overriding process makes the system appear to be more unimodal than dual-procesing.
Other commentators regard quantitative rather than qualitative differences in the two processes
(Osman, 2013), vagueness of the definitions, and a lack of testable predictions (Keren, 2013).
Evans and Stanovich (2013b) counter this last point by explaining that they were not describing a
testable theory but rather a metatheory that does not have testable predictions.
Three-Dimensional Decision-Making Model
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In an attempt to lessen the issues with dual-processing models, Strough and colleagues
(2011) described a three-dimensional model, in which three dimensions or aspects of the
decision-making process (deliberative, experiential, and affective) are overlapping (see Figure 1;
slight adaptations [a level of individual differences (age) and short- vs. long-term information
have been added and decision domain, justification instructions, and investment amount and
dimension have been removed] have been made for this study). In this three-dimensional model,
the deliberative system is as described above: effortful and has a high reliance on rules and
formal operations (Evans, 2008; Osman, 2004). However, the third domain is created by
separating the affective and experiential systems. Critiques of the dual-processing models
suggest that the two systems are not independent, lending to a degree of overlap (Keren & Schul,
2009; Kruglanski, 2013).
The current conceptual framework depicts the three dimensions as overlapping,
demonstrating that it is likely that decisions occur as a result of the three dimensions working
together rather than in isolability. For example, people often have an emotional reaction when
thinking about a previous experience they are using to help them make a decision (Baumeister,
Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007) and these experiences often have emotions connected to them as
a sort of “somatic marker” (Bechara & Demasio, 2005). In this way, the affective and
experiential processes are closely interacting. Furthermore, it is common for people to reason
about their feelings when making a decision (Barrett, 2005), resulting in an interaction between
the deliberative and affective processes (Strough et al., 2011). Similarly, people reason about
their experiences, resulting in an overlap in the deliberative and experiential processes. In these
examples, it is impossible to determine outright which system is responsible for making a
decision without considering more than one system. The amount of involvement of the three
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dimensions is one of degree, not a categorical difference. That is, in the three-dimensional
framework, rather than determining if a particular system is used to make a decision, it is a
matter of how much each system contributes to making the decision. In addition to examining
circumstances under which the framing effect occurred in the current study, participants were
also asked to indicate to what extent they used their deliberative, experiential, and affective
systems, as indicated by instructions particular to each condition.
In the current study, participants were assigned to one of four instruction manipulation
conditions: deliberative (i.e., use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers),
experiential (i.e., use only your previous and experiences of others that you are familiar with),
affective (i.e., use only your initial reactions and gut feelings), and a control condition (i.e., make
your decisions as you normally would). Participants were asked to what extent they used each
condition as a manipulation check. It was expected that there would be overlap in the type of
information the participants used in each condition, but the degree to which they used the
information would differ, resulting in different decisions. Participants also completed the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and the General Decision-Making Styles
questionnaire (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995). The CRT categorizes participants as either
intuitive or deliberative decision makers. The GDMS categorizes participants according to five
categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous.
Dual-Processes and Age Differences
Inconsistencies between younger and older adults’ susceptibility to the framing effect are
also apparent when they are instructed to utilize deliberative and experiential processes,
according to previous research (e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012; Woodhead et al., 2011). In a mixed
between- (instructions and age) and within-subjects (frame) design, Thomas and Millar (2012)
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found that both younger and older adults did not demonstrate the framing effect when they were
required to calculate the expected value of the situation or were told to “think like a scientist.”
Thomas and Millar (2012) theorized that the framing effect was eliminated as the result of an
indirect activation of analytic (deliberative) processes. However, when participants were
instructed to use their “initial reactions” to make their decisions, they were more likely to
demonstrate the framing effect. Based on the results of Thomas and Millar (2012), rational
decision making may occur as a result of effortful, deliberate, analytic processing.
However, Thomas and Millar’s (2012) results are inconsistent to those of Woodhead and
colleagues (2011) if their manipulation requiring participants to “think like a scientist” caused
the participants to pay attention to the facts and figures in the decision situation. (However,
because instructing someone to "think like a scientist" is ambiguous at best, it is impossible to
tell what participants were doing when making their decisions.) Woodhead et al. (2011)
identified differences regarding the type of decision-making strategy that younger vs. older
adults utilized when making decisions about framing situations. Older adults were more likely to
use an experience-related decision strategy and younger adults were more likely to use a datadriven strategy (Woodhead et al., 2011). Furthermore, participants who used the data-driven
strategy (more typical of younger adults) were more susceptible to the framing effect than those
who used the experience-related strategies. These results suggest that participants who use
deliberative, effortful processes to make decisions (especially younger adults), may end up
making irrational decisions, contrary to the results that Thomas and Millar (2012) reported. Less
susceptibility to the framing effect has been suggested to occur due to an indirect activation of
deliberative processing (e.g., Woodhead et al., 2011) and the experiential/affective processing
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(e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012), resulting in an unclear depiction of when each system results in
demonstration of the framing effect and adult age differences.
Heuristics. One common assumption of dual-process models is that only the deliberative
system results in unbiased decisions (Peters, Dieckmann, & Weller, 2010). However, heuristics
(typical of the affective and experiential systems) are often used because they are efficient and
result in favorable decisions. Heuristics are considered to be “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer,
2008). Heuristics such as “avoid waste” result in decisions that are made quickly, and can result
in good outcomes (Strough et al., 2011). Experience can also lead to good decision outcomes.
For example, as people age, their experience leads to gains in wisdom (Worthy, Gorlick,
Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011), or “life pragmatics” (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger,
2006). This experience and knowledge may increase the likelihood of unbiased decision
outcomes. In this way, the affective and experiential systems yield unbiased decision outcomes
and these outcomes are not necessarily synonymous with only one processing system. As a
result, older adults may make unbiased decisions using the affective or experiential system.
Further research is needed to identify which system (including the affective system)
results in the demonstration of the framing effect. In the current study, younger, middle-aged,
and older adult participants were randomly assigned to an instruction manipulation group which
cued deliberative, experiential, or affective processing (separately) and were asked to answer
framing effect scenarios about lung cancer and the flu. They were also asked to indicate to what
extent they used information pertaining to each condition to make their decision. Consequently,
it was possible to see if cueing a particular decision-making dimension resulted in more or less
demonstration of the framing effect, if the instruction manipulation worked, and to what degree
the participants use all three dimensions.
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Underlying psychological processes. Previous research has identified older adults as
experiencing a decline in their deliberative processing (Peters, Hess, Vӓstjӓll, & Auman, 2007).
As a result, they may be more susceptible to the framing effect. However, Peters and colleagues
(2007) identified affect as being more resistant to the aging process and more influential as
people age. This is thought to result in deliberative processing as having a weaker influence on
decision making and affective processing as having a greater influence with age. Moreover, older
adults tend to have more sophisticated affective processing than younger adults as demonstrated
by evidence that people tend to process lesser amounts of information but focus more on the
quality of the information as they age (Reyna, 2004). This focus on affective information
requires the use of fewer cognitive resources than deliberation, lending to use of the affect
heuristic (Peters et al., 2007).
People also experience a shift in the importance of emotional goals as they age
(Carstensen, 2006). Due to a more limited time perspective, emotional goals are thought to
become more important to older adults. In addition, older adults have a tendency to pay more
attention to positive information (or less attention to negative information). Focusing on positive
information tends to result in losses not looming larger than gains for older adults, as they do for
younger adults (Mikels & Reed, 2009). Both the importance of emotional goals and attention to
positive information of older adults result in an effort to optimize their current emotional
experience.
In the current study, it was hypothesized that when older adults were instructed to use
their deliberative processing, they would make decisions more like the decisions made by
younger adults, and would demonstrate the framing effect as a result of the decline in their
deliberative processing (See Figure 2 for a pictorial representation). However, when participants
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were instructed to use their affective processing, younger adults would likely demonstrate the
framing effect more frequently than older adults due to their less advanced affective processing
and focus on losses as looming larger than gains. Conversely, it was also hypothesized that all
participants would be less likely to demonstrate the framing effect when using experiential
processing due to their use of outside information (their own or other’s previous experiences) to
make their decisions (see Figure 2).
Short- vs. Long-Term Risks and Benefits
Vignettes used to examine medical framing effects typically contain information
regarding immediate, short-, and long-term risks and benefits. For example, McNeil et al. (1982)
gave participants three types of information: an immediate treatment outcome, a short-term
outcome, and a long-term outcome. Some research indicates that the frame of a decision
influences what type of information, such as the risks or benefits, short- or long-term, is most
salient to the decision maker (e.g., Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982). In survival frames,
participants have been more willing to trade short-term risks for long-term benefits, but this has
not been seen in decisions framed as mortality (McNeil et al., 1982; O’Connor et al., 1985).
Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven decision-making strategies as
more likely to focus on the long-term benefits in the survival frame and short-term risks in the
mortality frame. Moreover, age differences in the focus on short- or long-term information have
also been identified (Kim et al., 2005). In their study, Kim et al. (2005) identified older adults as
more likely than younger adults to focus on long-term survival in the positive frame but shortterm survival in the negative frame. However, this previous research fails to discriminate
between the immediate and short-term outcomes. For instance, the lung cancer scenario provides
participants with the likelihood of surviving surgery and radiation initially and also gives short-
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term information (i.e., rate of survival after one month). Kim et al. (2005) and Woodhead et al.
(2011) considered the immediate and short-term outcomes as short-term information, making it
impossible to tell what is most important to the participants’ decision-making process: the
immediate outcome or the short-term risks of the decision situation.
In the current study, participants were asked to rate how important the short- and longterm information was to their decision, without the confounding immediate information. In
addition, participants completed the Consideration of Future Consequences scale (Strathman,
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) as a means of measuring the participants’ consideration
of the consequences of their potential behaviors. Together, these measures granted the
opportunity to examine the importance of short- vs. long-term information and future
consequences with regards to the framing effect and age.
Numeracy and the Framing Effect
Factors that may influence susceptibility to the framing effect, such as intelligence
(Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), expertise (Loke & Tan, 1992), need for cognition (Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002), and numeracy (Peters et al., 2006) have been examined. Numeracy
is an individual difference factor that has been examined and identified as making people more
susceptible to the framing effect (Peters et al., 2006). Numeracy is broadly defined as “the ability
to understand and use numerical information” (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009, p.
943).
In decision-making scenarios, particularly medical decisions, numerical information is
often used to present frequencies and probabilities of an event occurring. For example, a
probability that people will live or die such as the one given in the Asian Disease problem:
"There is a one-third probability that nobody will die, and a two-third probability that 600 people
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will die" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People tend to range in their abilities to understand and
use numerical information. Those low in numeracy have a tendency to be more susceptible to the
framing effect, biases in judgment and decision making, and reduced compliance to medical
directions (Lipkus, 2007; Reyna et al., 2009). Another factor to consider is that low numeracy is
not only found among people who are low in intelligence (Reyna et al., 2009) and it has been
cited as being related but separate from general intelligence (Peters, 2012). For example,
accountants who were experiencing cognitive decline in memory associated with non-numerical
information and retired bookkeepers with no cognitive decline were identified as having similar
levels of numeracy (Castel, 2007). Peters cites many research studies which used SAT scores as
a control resulting in an enduring significant effect of numeracy.
The numerical information may also lead people to determine the credibility of the risk
information based on how accurate, relevant, useful, clear, and easy it is to understand (Lipkus,
2007). Furthermore, numbers often lack the sensitivity to trigger automatic reactions and
intuition, preventing the use of deliberative processing. However, people often have difficulty
understanding and applying necessary mathematical equations or concepts (such as converting
decimals to percentages, etc.) (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Woloshin, Schwartz, Moncur,
Gabriel, & Tosteson, 2001), leading to an increased susceptibility to demonstrating the framing
effect. Despite this research, it is a common assumption that people are adept at using numbers
and appreciate their value as a result of their education and daily use (Lipkus, 2007).
In spite of the research demonstrating a lack of numerical ability, the literature used to
educate people on decision making indicates that people should pay close attention to the facts
and figures in the decision situation (Thompson, 2004; Wargo, 2008). Current recommendations
are to explain quantities such as the short-term risk of a treatment in a qualitative manner,
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display numerical information pictorially, and to cue the retrieval of health-related knowledge
(Wargo, 2008). This consideration is important especially for complex decisions such as medical
decisions due to the occurrence of numerical values and probabilities presented in medical
decisions. However, Woodhead and colleagues’ (2011) results demonstrating the framing effect
when deliberation was used suggest that it may be inappropriate to encourage people to use the
data in the decision situations to make their decisions. Furthermore, the research on numeracy
indicates that most people are not good with numbers. Together, these factors suggest that it is
important to investigate numeracy as a factor that contributes to the framing effect.
In the present study, numeracy was evaluated as a control variable. Because studies on
decision making often use vignettes containing numerical values and require simple
mathematical procedures, numeracy is an important topic to evaluate. Furthermore, using
numeracy as a covariate helped control for individual differences in numerical ability.
Summary
Because the research regarding adult age differences in the framing effect has continued
to yield inconsistent results, the current study examined younger, middle-aged, and older adults’
susceptibility to the framing effect. In addition, there has not been a clear distinction in
susceptibility to the framing effect with regards to the use of deliberative and
affective/experiential processing. The present study separated affective and experiential
processing by using an instruction manipulation to cue deliberative, affective, or experiential
processing. Moreover, participants were asked to indicate whether the short- or long-term
information was most salient to their decision making. Participants’ consideration of future
consequences was also measured to investigate whether their focus on short- or long-term
information is related to how they consider future consequences of their behaviors. In addition,
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numeracy has been identified as a potential factor that makes people more susceptible to the
framing effect. Using numeracy as a covariate eliminated it as an individual-difference variable
that may affect participants’ susceptibility to the framing effect.
The current study is innovative in that it is the first of its kind to examine the framing
effect using a three-dimensional decision-making framework. The current study also sought to
resolve the inconsistencies in the literature regarding age differences in demonstration of the
framing effect. Moreover, the current study eliminated the confound between immediate and
short-term information to more thoroughly examine the influence of short- vs. long-term
information.
Statement of the Problem
Previous research has identified differences in susceptibility to the framing effect
depending on the type of processing (Thomas & Millar, 2012) and decision-making strategy that
is used (Woodhead et al., 2011). Although the framing effect has been examined extensively,
results regarding age differences remain inconsistent. As a result and in light of the recent
research suggesting differences in susceptibility to the framing effect depending on whether
deliberative or experiential processing is activated, age differences should be examined more
thoroughly. Furthermore, a third dimension, the role of affective processing, needs to be better
understood because age differences in affect regulation are becoming increasingly welldocumented.
The current study is novel in that it included an instruction manipulation that instructed
younger, middle-aged, and older adult participants to either use only logic and reasoning based
on the facts and numbers (deliberative processing), to use only their initial reactions and gut
feelings (affective processing), or to use only their previous experiences and experiences of
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others (experiential processing) to come to a decision. Some recommendations for making
rational medical decisions explain that people should use the data in the decision-making
scenario to make a rational decision (Thompson, 2004; Wargo, 2008). The results Thomas and
Millar (2012) found are counter to this practice. The current study manipulated the type of
information that participants were to pay attention, allowing an exploration into what type of
processing is most reliable. Furthermore, by including age as a predictor, more information was
obtained regarding the type of information that is most pertinent to younger, middle-aged, and
older adults. In addition, an age-related difference in susceptibility to the framing effect was also
examined, a trend that, at this point, has failed to be determined.
Furthermore, by including age as a predictor, more information pertaining to the type of
information pertinent to each age group was identified in addition to which age group is more
susceptible to the framing effect, a trend that has yet to be determined.
Previous research has also identified differences in the influence of short- vs. long-term
information, but has failed to distinguish between the immediate outcomes and the short-term
outcomes of the decision-making situation (Kim et al., 2005; Woodhead et al., 2011). The
current study addressed this issue by eliminating the immediate outcomes from the decisionmaking situation to focus on the difference between the short- and long-term outcomes. It was
expected that the frame of the decision situation would influence what type of information
(short- vs. long-term) is most salient to the decision maker. It was the goal of the current study to
contribute to the literature by examining the information that is most influential to participants
when deliberation, affect, and experience are cued.
Additionally, people low in numeracy have been identified as less able to make rational
decisions and more susceptible to the framing effect (Peters, 2012). Because medical decisions
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are complex and often contain numerous numerical values and require an understanding of
probabilities and odds, numeracy was measured and used as a covariate. The current study
further investigated how objective numeracy affected susceptibility to the framing effect in light
of deliberation, experience, and affect. Participants who have low numeracy were likely to be
more susceptible to demonstrating the framing effect, especially those instructed to use
deliberation (i.e., pay attention to the facts and figures).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1
Do younger, middle-aged, or older adults in the deliberative, affective, or experiential
conditions demonstrate the framing effect more frequently?
Hypothesis 1a. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven
decision-making strategies as more likely to demonstrate the framing effect. Based on these
results, participants in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to
demonstrate the framing effect than participants in the affective or experiential conditions.
Hypothesis 1b. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified younger adults as using data-driven
strategies more frequently than older adults. Reyna (2004) identified older adults as having a
more sophisticated affective system. In the current study, younger adults in the deliberative and
affective conditions were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing effect more frequently than
younger adults in the experiential condition.
Hypothesis 1c. Based on Woodhead et al. (2011), older adults in the deliberative
condition were hypothesized to be more likely to demonstrate the framing effect than older
adults in the experiential and affective conditions.
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Hypothesis 1d. Because affect becomes more influential as people age (Peters et al.,
2007) and the affective system becomes more sophisticated with age (Reyna, 2004), older adults
in the affective system were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing effect less frequently than
younger adults in the affective condition.
Research Question 2
Are the short-term risks or long-term benefits more influential to decisions among
younger, middle-aged, or older adults in the survival or mortality (or flu or no flu) frame
depending on the instruction manipulation (deliberative, affective, or experiential)?
Hypothesis 2a. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven
strategies as more likely to focus on the long-term benefits in the survival frame and short-term
risks in the mortality frame. Drawing from these results, in the current study, participants’
decisions were hypothesized to be influenced more by the short-term information in the mortality
(or getting the flu) frame and by the long-term information in the survival (or not getting the flu)
frame when instructed to use their deliberative system.
Hypothesis 2b. Kim et al. (2005) identified older adults as more likely than younger
adults to focus on long-term survival in the positive frame. In the current study, the long-term
information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame was hypothesized to influence older
adults’ decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults.
Hypothesis 2c. Kim et al. (2005) also identified older adults as being more likely than
younger adults to focus on short-term survival in the negative frame. Based on these results, the
short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame was hypothesized to influence
older adults' decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults.
Research Question 3
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Does numeracy affect susceptibility to the framing effect among younger, middle-aged,
and older adults when instructed to use the deliberative, affective, or experiential system?
Hypothesis 3. Peters et al. (2006) identified participants who are lower in numeracy as
more susceptible to the framing effect. As a result, in the current study, participants who have
low numeracy were hypothesized to be more susceptible to the framing effect than participants
higher in numeracy.
Method
Design
A between-subjects design was used. The independent variables were the instruction
manipulation (deliberative, experiential, or affective processing), short- vs. long-term
information, frame (e.g., survival vs. mortality), and age. The dependent variable was the
decision outcome (e.g., surgery or radiation). Objective numeracy was used as a control variable.
Participants
Three hundred and forty-three participants (119 younger adults; 18-37; M = 27.24, SD =
4.73, 118 middle-aged adults; 40-58; M = 47.08, SD = 4.87, and 108 older adults; 60-87; M =
64.47; SD = 4.22) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011) during the course of 3 days. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a web-based interface
that permits the recruitment of participants via Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Researchers
post advertisements for their studies in the HITs and qualified participants can take the surveys
for payment. Participants accrue money as they participate in HITs, allowing them to remove the
funds as Amazon gift cards or later be paid to their bank account. In the current study,
participants were paid $1.50 as compensation for their survey completion that took an average of
31 minutes to complete. This amount of payment is typical of Amazon Mechanical Turk as the
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program is set up so that participants accrue money as they participate in multiple studies. In the
current study, participants were limited to those with an approval rate greater than 95%, greater
than 500 approved HITs, and those who live in the United States. The study was not visible to
participants who did not meet those requirements. Table 1 contains demographic information for
the participants.
Procedure
Participants read the consent form and indicated their consent before participating in the
study. Participants were rerouted from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website to an external link
via Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, Inc.) to complete the study. Before completing the framing items,
participants completed the demographic questionnaire (Appendix B). They also completed the
General Decision-Making Styles scale (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Appendix C), the
Numeracy scale (Lipkus et al., 2001; Appendix D), and the Resistance to Framing measure
(Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2007; Appendix E) before they completed the framing effect questions.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four instruction manipulation conditions:
deliberative, experiential, affective, or control (see Appendix A). Participants in all conditions
completed the same questionnaires. They first read instructions telling them to either answer the
decision situation using "only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers," "based on
their initial reactions and gut feelings," to make their decisions based on "only their previous
experiences and experiences of others that they are familiar with," or to "make their decisions as
they normally would" depending if they have been randomly assigned to the deliberative,
affective, experiential, or control condition, respectively. They then read two vignettes detailing
a medical situation (i.e., lung cancer or the flu) in which a decision needed to be made regarding
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their medical treatment (Appendix A). They were presented with each vignette once, framed as
survival or mortality.
After completing each framing effect vignette (cancer and flu), they were asked to what
extent they used each type of processing in their decision making (manipulation check). They
were then asked to indicate whether the short- or long-term information was most important to
their decisions and finished the study by completing the Consideration of Future Consequences
scale (CFC; Strathman et al., 1994; Appendix F) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005; Appendix G). When participants completed all of the measures, they were
debriefed about the purpose of the study. The participants were compensated via their Amazon
Mechanical Turk account.
Measures
Demographics. The demographic questionnaire that was completed by each participant
assessed gender, race, ethnicity, age, sex, marital status, highest education attained, current or
previous major, type of job of longest employment, current job, income, and questions regarding
difficulty paying bills (Appendix B). Participants were also asked to rate their experience with
economic principles and their personal and vicarious experience with medical decision making,
lung cancer, and the flu on a scale from 1 (no experience) to 5 (much experience). Participants
also indicated their perceived decision-making ability in light of their own aging as better, the
same, or not as good (Appendix B).
General Decision-Making Style. Decision-making style was measured using the
General Decision Making Style scale (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Appendix C). The GDMS is
comprised of 25 items that are broken into 5 subscales: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant,
and spontaneous. Participants responded to each item on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = strongly
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disagree; 5 = strongly agree). A total score for each subscale was computed by averaging across
items from each of the subscales. An example rational item is the following: “I double-check my
information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making decisions.” Reliability for the
five subscales is as follows (Loo, 2000): rational (α = .81), intuitive (α = .79), dependent (α =
.62), avoidant (α = .79), and spontaneous (α = .76). The ranges, means, and standard deviations
for the subscales are as follows: rational (2.00-5.00; M = 3.20, SD = .43), intuitive (1.80-5.00; M
= 3.16, SD = .49), dependent (1.40-5.00; M = 3.08, SD = .59), avoidant (1.00-4.40; M = 2.53, SD
= .63), and spontaneous (1.75-4.20; M = 2.90, SD = .42).
Numeracy Scale. Numeracy was measured by using the Numeracy scale (Appendix D)
developed by Lipkus et al. (2001). The Numeracy scale is comprised of 11 items that evaluate
how well participants can understand and use probabilities, percentages, and simple
mathematical procedures. An example item is the following:
“Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please
circle only one choice that best represents your answer.
A) 1 in 100
B) 1 in 1,000
C) 1 in 10”
Two out of 11 items are multiple choice items while the other nine are open-ended questions.
Participants’ numeracy scores are determined by adding the number of correct items. Scores
ranged from 0-11.00 (M = 8.62, SD = 2.09).
Resistance to framing. Each participant’s resistance to the framing effect was measured
using the attribute framing subscale of the Resistance to Framing measure (Bruine de Bruin et
al., 2007; Appendix E). Fourteen items measured attribute framing. Items used to measure
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attribute framing are framed in positive and negative manners (seven items of each). Participants
completed this measure prior to undergoing the instruction manipulation. The following is an
example of an attribute item framed positively:
“Imagine that a new technique has been developed to treat a particular kind of cancer.
This technique has a 50% chance of success, and is available at the local hospital.
A member of your immediate family is a patient at the local hospital with this kind of
cancer. Would you encourage him or her to undergo treatment using this technique?”
Participants responded on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = definitely no; 6 = definitely yes). Scores for
were determined by calculating the difference between the analogous items and then averaging
across the items. The Cronbach’s alpha is .80. Scores ranged from -1.67-3.43 (M = .36, SD =
.74).
Instruction manipulation condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
instruction manipulation groups: deliberative, experiential, affective, or a control condition (see
Appendix A). Pilot testing was conducted to determine an effective instruction manipulation for
each condition. Upon examination of the pilot data, the framing effect was most prevalent using
the instruction manipulations described below. These instruction manipulations also resulted in
significant differences from one another in a manipulation check (see below) verifying the
information that participants were paying attention to while making their decisions in the pilot
study. The instruction manipulations for this study have been modified from the manipulation
used by Thomas and Millar (2012). The instructions for each condition were as follows (also
found in Appendix A):
[Deliberative condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and
reasoning based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page."
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Participants were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations with the
following instructions: "Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers
presented in the scenarios to make your decision."
[Affective condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial
reactions and gut feelings to make your decision on the following page." Participants were
reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations with the following
instructions: "Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your decision."
[Experiential condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the
following page." They were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations
with the following instructions: "Please use only your previous experiences and those of others
to make your decision."
[Control condition]: "Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you
normally would." They were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations
with the following instructions: "Please make your decision as you normally would."
Framing effect. The framing effect was measured by presenting participants with one
pair of medical vignettes adapted from McNeil et al. (1982) and a pair of medical vignettes
created for this study based on McNeil et al. (1982) (see Appendix A). The vignettes were edited
by eliminating the immediate information from the decision-making vignettes to remove the
confound between the immediate- and short-term information. The McNeil et al. (1982)
vignettes require participants to consider treatment for cancer and the other pair required
participants to determine how they would like to receive a vaccination for the flu (modeled after
McNeil et al.’s (1982) vignettes but designed for this study; Appendix E). The cancer vignettes
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are framed in terms of either survival or mortality. The flu vignettes are framed in terms of either
getting the flu or not getting the flu. Before reading and answering the vignettes, participants
read a short description of each option, including symptoms of each option and recovery time
(see Appendix A). The following is an example of two of the framing decision situations for the
cancer scenario, framed in terms of survival:
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 77 patients live for more than 1 year, and 23
patients live for more than 5 years.
Of 100 patients having surgery, 68 patients live for more than 1 year, and 32 patients live
for more than 5 years.
Participants were then asked to decide rather they would choose radiation or surgery. The cancer
and flu decision situations were analyzed individually as separate decision choices. In the
analyses, frame was used as a predictor for decision outcome. Specifically, frame (e.g., survival
vs. mortality) as a significant predictor of decision outcome (e.g., surgery vs. radiation) indicated
that the framing effect occurred. That is, different decisions were made based on the frame of the
decision situation.
Manipulation check. As a manipulation check for the instruction manipulation,
participants indicated to what extent they used logic and reasoning based on the facts and
numbers, their experiences and those of others, and their initial reactions and gut feelings (see
Appendix H). Participants answered each question regardless to which condition they were
randomly assigned. The questions were presented after participants answered each framing
vignette to gauge the type of information that they used to make their decision.
Short- vs. long-term information. To assess whether the short- or long-term
information was most salient in the participants’ decision making, they were asked to rate how
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important the short- and long-term information was to their decision (see Appendix H). The
following is an example asking the participants to rate the short-term information: “How
important was the short-term information (i.e., the number of patients living or who had died one
year after receiving the treatment) to you in your decision making?”
Consideration of Future Consequences. Participants completed the Consideration of
Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman et al., 1994; Appendix F) to measure individual
differences in people’s consideration of distant vs. immediate consequences of potential
behaviors. The scale is comprised of 12 items to which the participants responded on a scale of 1
(extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic). To score the CFC scale, items 3, 4,
5, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were reversed scored. All of the items were then summed, with higher scores
indicating that a participant has a greater consideration of future consequences. The Cronbach’s
alpha was .88 and scores ranged from 1.63-5.00 (M = 3.48, SD = .66)
Cognitive Reflection Test. The Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) is comprised
of three hypothetical vignettes that require the participants to give a solution to a simple
mathematical question (e.g., asking how much an item costs given the price of another item;
Appendix G). The three vignettes are simple enough that participants easily understand them
when they are explained, but often yield incorrect decisions, likely as a result of participants
relying on their intuition (Frederick, 2005). Participants’ answers are classified as either
deliberative or intuitive. Intuitive answers are frequently given, but yield incorrect answers. An
intuitive answer was given a score of 0. A deliberative answer is a correct decision and was
given a score of 1. Total scores were calculated by summing across the 3 vignettes for a range of
0-3.00 (M = 1.53, SD = 1.24).
Results
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Data Cleaning
See Table 2 for steps taken to ensure data quality such as removal of data based on trap
questions, inconsistently reported birth years and Amazon Mechanical Turk IDs. Table 2 also
contains information pertaining to outliers and multicollinearity. Within the survey were three
"trap" questions designed to assess the participants' level of attention throughout the survey. In
addition, participants were asked to verify their birth year and Mechanical Turk ID on two
separate occasions, once in the beginning of the survey and once near the end of the survey prior
to being given their survey code to enter into the Mechanical Turk system.
Preliminary Analyses
Pearson correlations were also conducted between the measures (see Table 3). Close
inspection reveals that CFC and the importance of long-term information were positively
correlated. Age and perceived decision-making ability were also positively correlated. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) or multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted
for each measure (i.e., GDMS, Resistance to Framing, CRT, CFC, and numeracy) for each
condition and age group.
Manipulation check. A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess differences in the
three instruction manipulations: the extent to which participants used their logic and reasoning
based on the facts and numbers, their experiences and those of others, and their initial reactions
and gut feelings to make their decisions. Participants were asked to respond to three questions
post-framing vignettes (see description in Measures above).
Deliberative. An ANOVA was used to examine the difference in extent that participants
used the deliberative information (i.e., their logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers)
to answer the framing vignettes. There was a significant difference in the extent to which
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participants indicated that they used the deliberative information by condition, F(1,340) = 17.74,
p < .001, η2 = .14. That is, participants in the deliberative condition (M = 4.40, SD = .63)
indicated that they used the facts and figures significantly more than participants in the
experiential (M = 3.65, SD = 1.03), affective (M = 3.42, SD = 1.03), and control (M = 3.80, SD =
.96) conditions. Participants in the experiential condition did not differ in the extent to which
they used the deliberative information from participants in the control and affective conditions.
However, participants in the control condition indicated that they used the facts and figures
significantly more than participants in the affective condition.
Experience. There was a significant difference in the extent to which participants
indicated that they used the experiential information (i.e., their previous experiences or those of
others that they are familiar with) to answer the framing vignettes in the experiential condition,
F(1,340) = 17.36, p < .001, η2 = .13. Participants in the experiential condition (M = 3.62, SD =
1.11) indicated that they used their previous experiences significantly more than participants in
the deliberative (M = 2.40, SD = 1.23), affective (M = 2.77, SD = 1.28), and control (M = 2.66,
SD = 1.13) conditions. No differences existed between participants in the deliberative and
affective conditions, the deliberative and control conditions, and the affective and control
conditions.
Affect. There was a significant difference in the extent to which participants indicated
that they used the affective information (i.e., their initial reactions and gut feelings) to answer the
framing vignettes in the affective condition, F(1,340) = 17.25, p < .001, η2 = .13. Participants in
the affective condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.06) used their gut feelings and intuition significantly
more than participants in the deliberative (M = 2.56, SD = 1.30), experiential (M = 3.23, SD =
1.08), and control (M = 2.95, SD = 1.06) conditions. Participants in the experiential condition
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also used their gut feelings and intuition more than participants in the deliberative condition. No
other significant differences were noted.
General Decision-Making Scale. An age difference was present for the avoidant
subscale (see Table 4). Specifically, younger adults (M = 2.65, SD = .61) were more avoidant
than middle-aged adults (M = 2.41, SD = .59). There was no difference between younger and
older adults (M = 2.54, SD = .66) and older and middle-aged adults. There were no other
significant differences in age, condition, or an interaction between age and condition (see Table
4).
Resistance to Framing. There was no age difference in resistance to framing, F(1,331) =
.24 p = .78, η2 = .001. Younger, (M = .34, SD = .66), middle-aged (M = .39, SD = .77), and older
adults (M = .33, SD = .76) did not differ. There was also no difference in instruction
manipulation condition, F(1,331) = .79 p = .50, η2 = .007. Resistance to framing did not differ
depending on the deliberative (M = .34, SD = .78), experiential (M = .46, SD = .68), affective (M
= .30, SD = .75), and control (M = .31, SD = .72) condition. The interaction between age and
instruction manipulation condition was also not significant.
Cognitive Reflection Test. There was no age difference in cognitive reflection, F(1,331)
= 1.38, p = .25, η2 = .01. Specifically, younger (M = 1.68, SD = 1.21), middle-aged (M = 1.48,
SD = 1.30), and older adults (M = 1.43, SD = 1.20) did not differ. There was also no difference in
instruction manipulation condition in cognitive reflection, F(1,331) = .96, p = .41, η2 = .001.
Cognitive reflection did not differ depending on the deliberative (M = 1.43, SD = 1.20),
experiential (M = 1.53, SD = 1.27), affective (M = 1.47, SD = 1.22), and control (M = 1.71, SD =
1.26) condition. The interaction between age and instruction manipulation condition was also not
significant, F(1,331) = 1.39, p = .22, η2 = .03.
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Consideration of Future Consequences. There was no age difference in consideration
of future consequences, F(1,331) = .98, p = .38, η2 = .006. Younger (M = 3.50, SD = .69),
middle-aged (M = 3.53, SD = .63), and older adults (M = 3.41, SD = .62) did not differ. There
was also no difference in instruction manipulation condition in consideration of future
consequences, F(1,331) = .42, p = .74, η2 = .004. Consideration of future consequences did not
differ depending on the deliberative (M = 3.44, SD = .64), experiential (M = 3.54, SD = .64),
affective (M = 3.51, SD = .68), and control (M = 3.45, SD = .66) condition. The interaction
between age and instruction manipulation condition was also not significant, F(1,331) = .66, p =
.68, η2 = .01.
Numeracy. There was no age difference in numeracy, F(1,331) = 1.06, p = .35, η2 = .006.
Younger (M = 8.52, SD = 2.16), middle-aged (M = 8.53, SD = 2.08), and older adults (M = 8.88,
SD = 1.95) did not differ. There was also no difference in instruction manipulation condition in
numeracy, F(1,331) = .2.17, p = .09, η2 = .02. Numeracy did not differ depending on the
deliberative (M = 8.71, SD = 2.02), experiential (M = 8.66, SD = 1.81), affective (M = 8.17, SD =
2.64), and control (M = 8.99, SD = 1.63) condition. The interaction between age and instruction
manipulation condition was also not significant, F(1,331) = .58, p = .75, η2 = .01.
Framing Effect
In the current study, frame (e.g., survival vs. mortality) was used as a predictor for the
decision outcome (e.g., surgery or radiation). That is, participants are more likely to choose
surgery (exhibit risk aversion) in the survival frame and radiation in the mortality frame (exhibit
risk seeking). Table 5 gives the frequencies and percentages for each decision choice per vignette
for each instruction condition by frame. These frequencies demonstrate that participants were
more likely to indicate that they would choose surgery in the survival frame and radiation in the
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condition, in which participants indicated for both the survival and morality frame that they
would be more likely to choose radiation, 53.7% and 69.8% respectively. For the flu vignette,
overall participants indicated that they would choose the vaccination shot over the nasal spray
despite the frame and instruction condition. Table 6 gives the frequencies and percentages for
each decision choice per vignette for each instruction condition, frame, and age difference.
Research Question 1
Hypotheses 1a-1d.
[1a] Participants in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to
demonstrate the framing effect than participants in the affective or experiential
conditions.
[1b] Younger adults in the deliberative and affective conditions were hypothesized to
demonstrate the framing effect more frequently than younger adults in the experiential
condition.
[1c] Older adults in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to
demonstrate the framing effect than older adults in the experiential and affective
conditions.
[1d] Older adults in the affective system were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing
effect less frequently than younger adults in the affective condition.
Overall Framing Effect
Lung cancer. A 2 (frame: survival vs. mortality) x 2 (surgery vs. radiation) chi-square
was used to examine the framing effect. The chi-square value was significant, χ2(1, N = 343) =
16.40, p < .001, phi = .22. In the mortality frame, 107 participants (62.2%) chose radiation and
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65 participants (37.8%) chose surgery. In the survival frame, 68 participants (39.8%) chose
radiation and 103 participants (60.2%) chose surgery.
Flu. A 2 (frame: no flu vs. get flu) x 2 (vaccination shot vs. nasal spray) chi-square was
used to examine the framing effect. The chi-square value was not significant, χ2(1, N = 344) =
2.60, p = .085, phi = .10. In the negative (get flu) frame, 115 participants (66.1%) chose the
vaccination shot and 59 participants (33.9%) chose the nasal spray. In the positive (no flu) frame,
97 participants (57.1%) chose the vaccination shot and 73 participants (42.9%) chose the nasal
spray.
Age by Instruction Condition by Frame Interaction
Logistic regression models for each predictor individually can be found in Appendix I.
Reported below are the logistic regression models with the all of the predictors in the model (i.e.,
age, instruction condition, and frame) and models containing numeracy as a control variable.
Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of frame (survival
or mortality), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition
(deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and decision choice (surgery or
radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ2(23, N
= 342) = 34.99, p = .052 (Cox and Snell R Square, 9.7%; Nagelkerke R Square, 13%), indicating
that the model did not significantly distinguish between participants who indicated they would
choose surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly
classified 64.3% of cases. Frame, instruction condition, age, and the interactions were not
significant predictors of decision (see Table 7).
Lung cancer: Numeracy as a covariate. A logistic regression was performed to assess
the impact of frame (survival or mortality), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and
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instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors, numeracy
as a covariate, and decision choice (surgery or radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the
outcome. Numeracy was entered at step 1 and frame, age, and instruction condition were entered
at step 2. The model at step 1 was not significant, χ2(1, N = 342) = .024, p = .88. The model at
step 2 was approaching significance, χ2(23, N = 342) = 34.97, p = .052 (Cox and Snell R Square,
9.7%; Nagelkerke R Square, 13%). The model correctly classified 64.3% of cases. None of the
predictors nor the interactions between predictors were significant (see Table 8).
Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu), age
(younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition (deliberative, experiential,
affective, and control) as predictors and decision choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu
prevention as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ2(23, N = 343) = 25.00, p = .35
(Cox and Snell R Square, 7.0%; Nagelkerke R Square, 9.5%). The model correctly classified
64.4% of cases. There was a significant age by condition by frame interaction for older adults in
the control condition and positive flu frame (odds ratio .023). This indicates that older adults in
the control condition and positive flu frame were less than 1 times more likely to choose nasal
spray over the vaccination shot than participants in the deliberative instruction condition (see
Table 9). In addition, there was a significant age by condition interaction for older adults in the
affective condition (odds ratio 12.96), indicating that these participants were over 12 times as
likely to choose the nasal spray over the vaccination shot (see Table 9).
Flu: Numeracy as a covariate. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the
flu or not get the flu), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition
(deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors, numeracy as a covariate, and
decision choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. Numeracy
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was entered at step 1 and frame, age, and instruction condition were entered at step 2. The model
at step 1 was not significant, χ2(1, N = 343) = .10, p = .75. The model at step 2 was not
significant, χ2(23, N = 344) = 24.90, p = .36 (Cox and Snell R Square, 7.0%; Nagelkerke R
Square, 9.5%). The model correctly classified 64.7% of cases. None of the predictors were
significant (see Table 10). However, an age by condition interaction was present. Older adults in
the control condition (odds ratio 12.99) were over 12 times as likely to choose the nasal spray
over the vaccination shot (see Table 10).
Summary for Hypotheses 1a-1d
In summary, the framing effect was present in the lung cancer scenario overall, with
participants in the survival condition indicating that they would choose surgery over radiation.
The framing effect was not present in the flu scenario. There were no age-related or instruction
condition differences in the framing effect for the lung cancer and flu scenarios. However, an age
by instruction condition interaction was present in the flu scenario (with and without numeracy
as a covariate).
Research Question 2
Hypothesis 2a. Participants’ decisions were hypothesized to be influenced more by the
short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame and by the long-term
information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame when instructed to use their deliberative
system.
Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 2 (frame: survival vs.
mortality) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of shortand long-term information in the survival vs. mortality frames of participants in the deliberative
condition. Results revealed a significant difference in frame for the short-term information,
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F(1,340) = 5.79, p = .02, η2 = .02. Participants in the mortality frame indicated that the short-term
information (M = 3.86, SD = 1.06) influenced their decision more than participants in the
survival frame (M = 3.57, SD = 1.14). No difference in frame was identified for the long-term
information, F(1,340) = 3.72, p = .05, η2 = .01.
Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 2 (frame: no flu vs. got flu)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of short- and longterm information in the no flu vs. got flu frames of participants in the deliberative condition.
There was no difference in short-term information in the no flu and got flu frames, F(1,341) =
.14, p = .71, η2 = .00. The influence of the short-term information did not differ in the got flu
frame (M = 3.59, SD = 1.23) and the no flu frame (M = 3.54, SD = 1.14).
No difference was found in the long-term information, F(1,341) = .72, p = .40, η2 = .002.
The importance of the long-term information did not differ in the got flu (M = 3.68, SD = 1.15)
and no flu frame (M = 3.78, SD = 1.04).
Summary for Hypothesis 2a
The short-term information was more important to participants’ decisions in the mortality
frame than the survival frame in the deliberative condition. There was no difference in
importance of the long-term information in the survival and mortality frames. In the flu scenario,
there was no difference in the importance of short- or long-term information in either the no flu
or got flu frames.
Hypothesis 2b. The long-term information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame
was hypothesized to influence older adults’ decisions more than younger and middle-aged
adults.
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Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group:
younger, middle-aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine
the effect of short- and long-term information in the survival frame. Results revealed no
difference in age group for short-term information, F(1,167) = 1.90, p = .15, η2 = .02. The
importance of short-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.37, SD = 1.12),
middle-aged (M = 3.64, SD = 1.21), and older adults (M = 3.78, SD = 1.03). Similarly, no
difference was identified for long-term information F(1,167) = .24, p = .79, η2 = .003. The
importance of the long-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.97, SD = 1.01),
middle-aged (M = 4.03, SD = 1.07), and older adults (M = 4.10, SD = 1.01).
Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: younger, middleaged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of
short- and long-term information in the no flu frame. Results revealed no difference in age group
for short-term information, F(1,167) = .12, p = .88, η2 = .001. The importance of the short-term
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.60, SD = 1.12), middle-aged (M = 3.49, SD =
1.19), and older adults (M = 3.54, SD = 1.11). Results revealed no difference in age group for
long-term information, F(1,167) = .30, p = .74, η2 = .004. The importance of long-term
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.82, SD = .97), middle-aged (M = 3.81, SD =
1.12), and older adults (M = 3.69, SD = 1.04).
Summary for Hypothesis 2b
There was no main effect of age or instruction condition on the importance of short- and
long-term information in the survival (no flu) frame. Furthermore, there was no interaction
between age and instruction condition in the importance of the short- and long-term information
in the survival (no flu) frame.
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Hypothesis 2c. The short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame
was hypothesized to influence older adults' decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults.
Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group:
younger, middle-aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine
the effect of short- and long-term information in the mortality frame. Results revealed no
difference in age group for short-term information, F(1,168) = .59, p = .55, η2 = .01. The
importance of short-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.75, SD = 1.18),
middle-aged (M = 3.97, SD = .91), and older adults (M = 3.86, SD = 1.10). Similarly, no
difference was identified for long-term information F(1,167) = .99, p = .37, η2 = .01. The
importance of long-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.86, SD = 1.12),
middle-aged (M = 3.92, SD = 1.10), and older adults (M = 3.62, SD = 1.26).
Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: younger, middleaged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of
short- and long-term information in the got flu frame. Results revealed no difference in age
group for short-term information, F(1,169) = .38, p = .68, η2 = .01. The importance of short-term
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.48, SD = 1.11), middle-aged (M = 3.64, SD =
1.27), and older adults (M = 3.65, SD = 1.36). Results revealed no difference in age group for
long-term information, F(1,169) = .77, p = .47, η2 = .01. The importance of long-term
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.77, SD = 1.09), middle-aged (M = 3.53, SD =
1.17), and older adults (M = 3.73, SD = 1.21).
Summary for Hypothesis 2c
There was no main effect of age or instruction manipulation on the importance of shortand long-term information in the mortality (got flu) frame. In addition, there was no interaction
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between age and instruction condition in the importance of the short- and long-term information
in the mortality (got flu) frame.
Research Question 3
Hypothesis 3. Participants who have low numeracy were hypothesized to be more
susceptible to the framing effect than participants higher in numeracy.
Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed to assess the contribution of numeracy
and frame on the likelihood that participants would indicate that they would choose surgery or
radiation for lung cancer. The full model was significant, χ2 (3, N = 343) = 17.53, p = .001 (Cox
and Snell R Square, 5.0%; Nagelkerke R Square, 6.6%), indicating that the model significantly
distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose surgery and participants
who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly classified 61.2% of cases.
However, neither frame nor numeracy (or the interaction) significantly contributed to the model
(see Table 11).
Flu. A logistic regression was performed to assess the contribution of numeracy and
frame on the likelihood that participants would indicate that they would choose the vaccinator
the nasal spray for the flu. The full model was not significant, χ2 (3, N = 343) = 3.76, p = .29
(Cox and Snell R Square, 1.1%; Nagelkerke R Square, 1.5%), indicating that the model did not
distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose the vaccination shot and
participants who indicated they would choose the nasal spray. The model correctly classified
61.6% of cases. However, neither frame nor numeracy (or the interaction) significantly
contributed to the model (see Table 12).
Summary for Hypothesis 3
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The full model for the lung cancer and flu scenarios was significant; however, neither
frame nor numeracy was a significant predictor and there was no interaction between frame and
numeracy.
Discussion
Results revealed that decisions in the lung cancer scenario differed depending on frame;
specifically, participants were more likely to choose radiation in the mortality frame and surgery
in the survival frame. However, manipulating instructions according to deliberative, experiential,
or affective processing did not affect demonstration of the framing effect. Moreover, age-related
differences in the framing effect were not identified. On the other hand, interactions were
identified for the flu scenario: older adults in the affective condition were more likely to indicate
that they would choose the nasal spray than the vaccination shot in the positive flu frame. Older
adults were also more likely to choose nasal spray over the vaccination shot when in the control
condition and positive flu frame than those in the deliberative condition. As hypothesized, shortterm information was more salient to participants' decision in the mortality frame (lung cancer);
contrarily, there was no difference in the importance of long-term information (lung cancer or
flu).
Instruction Manipulation
Contrary to Thomas and Millar (2012), no differences were identified in demonstration of
the framing effect by processing group (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control). Despite
similarities in the instruction manipulation, participants in the current study responded to medical
decision-making vignettes, whereas Thomas and Millar (2012) had participants respond to
gambling scenarios. The medical decisions were much more complex and the outcomes more
serious (life vs. death or getting the flu vs. no flu) than in the gambling scenarios. As a result, it
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is possible that all participants, despite their instruction condition, thought more critically about
their decisions, resulting in similar vulnerability to the framing effect.
Although no differences were found as a result of the instruction manipulation, a
manipulation check revealed that the participants were correctly using the information they were
told to use to make their decisions. Specifically, in the deliberative condition, participants
indicated that they paid the most attention to the facts and figures; in the experiential condition
participants indicated that they used their previous experiences and those of others; and in the
affect condition, participants indicated that they used their gut feelings and intuition. However,
the analyses also revealed that participants in the control condition indicated that they used the
facts and figures more than participants in the affect condition and participants in the experiential
condition indicated that they used their gut feelings and intuition more than participants in the
deliberative condition. These results indicate that some overlap may have occurred in the extent
to which participants used the type of information they were told to use. This speaks to the
degree of overlap that is described by Strough et al. (2011) in the three processes. Specifically,
participants likely experienced competing processes when making their decision even after being
instructed to use particular elements of the decision-making scenario.
In addition, it could be that in situations requiring high mental cognitive function, people
are less sensitive to the framing effect, consistent with Thomas and Millar (2012). Thomas and
Millar (2012) found that the framing effect was eliminated when participants were primed to use
more analytical thinking by having them complete probability calculations in between blocks of
decision situations. Thus, when decisions require working memory and higher-level thinking,
people may be more prone to use their deliberative system or will think through their decisions
rather than using automatic processing or heuristics. In the current study, the decision-making
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vignettes were cognitively intense, requiring participants to think through various details about
the situations (see Appendix A).
Another possibility is that priming heuristics through the experiential and affective
conditions may also increase vulnerability (Cassotti et al., 2012). People have a tendency to
respond more strongly to losses than gains, also known as loss aversion or value function
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People could have also been
overweighting low probabilities and underweighting larger probabilities, a probability weighting
function (Soman, 2004). For example, people could have underweighted the probability of dying
after 5 years and overweighted the probability of dying after 1 year.
It is also possible that the type of processing influences people's decisions, but other
information related to the decision situation has a greater influence. For example, short-term
information was a significant predictor of decision in the mortality frame within the deliberative
condition. People could be using this information to make their decision, overriding their drive to
use a particular type of processing. Another possibility derived from the results regarding the
short-term information is that people could have been using their gist of the situation to make
their decision. That is, as Reyna (2004) described, gist representations are easy to access and are
comprised of an overall picture of the situation. However, the details are "fuzzy," and people
have a tendency to rely on their broad understanding of the situation to guide the way. In terms
of mortality, perhaps the short-term information is what is being used to create the gist (e.g., the
length of time that people will have before they die after treatment), creating a reliance on the
short-term information to make their decisions with the end result of making different decisions
depending on the frame.
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Finally, the prior experience that people have regarding hypothetical vignettes may lead
to differences in demonstration rates of the framing effect regardless of which decision-making
process is primed using instructions. Overall, 7.2% of participants indicated that they had a lot or
much experience with lung cancer and 31.9% of participants indicated that they had a lot or
much experience with the flu. However, 61.6% of participants indicated that they had a lot or
much experience with making medical decisions for themselves or others in the past 5 years. A
possibility is that participants did not have enough experience with making the types of decisions
that were asked of them to elicit a true response. A majority of the participants had a lot of
experience with making medical decisions in the past year, but did not have experience with the
flu or lung cancer. As a result, participants could have defaulted to thinking thoroughly about the
medical situations in an attempt to understand all of the information that was being given to them
regarding the decision they needed to make. In addition, the lack of significance regarding the flu
vignette could be a result of the unfamiliarity with a nasal spray as a vaccination method for the
flu. Participants could have chosen the treatment that they are the most knowledgeable about.
Contrarily, very few participants had experience with lung cancer, but radiation and surgery are
both commonly understood as treatments for lunch cancer.
Age Differences
No age differences were found in demonstration of the framing effect. Despite
differences being identified in previous literature (Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982; Mikels
& Reed, 2009; Wang et al., 2001), in the current study, only frame was a significant predictor of
decision outcome. This finding is consistent with previous research that has found little to no
age-related differences in demonstration of the framing effect (e.g., Mayhorn et al., 2002;
Rönnlund et al., 2005).
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Although it was hypothesized that age differences would be present, perhaps frame is a
more important predictor than age when making decisions. As a result, it may be more prudent
for doctors or other influential personnel to frame decisions in a particular manner as to prevent
the framing effect. For example, by presenting the outcomes in terms of both survival and
mortality people will have all of the information and may be able to make better decisions.
A potential explanation for these findings is that reading scenarios dealing with survival
vs. mortality primed participants to contemplate the end of their life, therefore, limiting their
time perspective. Previous research has identified a limited time perspective as being more
consistent with older adults (Carstensen, 2006). According to socioemotional selectivity theory,
people seek to optimize their current experiences when their time perspective is limited
(Cartensen, 2006; Carstensen & Charles, 1998). Because time is viewed as limited, people seek
to capitalize on their current experiences and minimize their losses. In the current study, the lung
cancer scenario was a life or death scenario, possibly limiting people's time perspective, resulting
in decisions that are similar to older adults’ decisions. In the mortality frame, they were more
likely to pay attention to the short-term. Because the short-term information was framed to
indicate the number of people who would die within 6 months, people may have been seeking to
use that information to maximize their current experience. That is, their limited time perspective
led them to pay close attention to the short-term information. In previous research, manipulating
younger adults' time perspectives to induce a limited time perspective leads them to behave like
older adults in examinations of a decision making bias called the sunk-cost fallacy (Strough,
Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster, & Pichayayothin, 2013).
Limitations
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The results presented here should be considered in light of some limitations. Despite the
quick, efficient data collection Amazon Mechanical Turk allows, as with any study, the quality
of the data may come into question. Trap questions were included to eliminate participants who
answered without reading the questions or were not paying enough attention, but participants on
Mechanical Turk are likely used to these types of questions, and may be able to easily identify
them. Furthermore, the instruction manipulation may work in a lab setting where outside factors,
such as background noise, attention to other tasks, etc., are being controlled. Conducting an
online study does not allow for control of these noise variables. However, laboratory settings do
not allow for broad generalizability or a national sample in most cases.
In addition, because the data was collected online, the sample of older adults was limited
to those ranging in age from 60 to 87 with the average age being 64.47. This range is younger
than the average older adult age reported in a meta-analysis by Mata et al. (2011) (M = 69).
Consequently, the results of the current study may be a factor of cohort differences rather than
age differences. The design of this study was also a between-subjects design. Although a
between-subjects design eliminates the possibility of participants recognizing a consistency issue
(Stanovich & West, 2008), it does not allow for comparisons within participants. Another
limitation of the current study is the unconfirmed conceptual model. No previous research has
attempted to investigate decision-making from a three-dimensional framework so this study
serves as a preliminary investigation.
Finally, the external validity of the current study may be limited by the methodology.
Participants were asked to imagine themselves in a medical situation and were told what type of
information to pay attention to. Previous research (Siminoff & Fetting, 1989) has found that
people who are making actual medical decisions are less susceptible to the framing effect than
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people who are asked to imagine themselves in a decision situation. This is likely because people
are more thorough with decisions that may directly affect them in the near and distant future.
Future research should examine this three-dimensional decision-making framework among
people who are making actual medical decisions.
Strengths
The current study is the first to expand the dual-process theory to a three-dimensional
conceptual decision-making framework. Previous research (Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009;
Kruglanski, 2013; Osman, 2013; Strough et al., 2011; Thompson, 2013) has demonstrated that
two processing systems may not be sufficient for explaining decision making, lending to a debate
as to whether two processes exist. Debates have raged on regarding the definitions of the two
processes, the terminology used to name the processes, and the characteristics that make up each
process. Although the results did not indicate a vulnerability to the framing effect depending on
the instruction condition, future research could examine other manipulations and decision
situations.
Moreover, the current study focused on medical decisions, decisions that are often lifechanging and threatening to people’s well-being, physically and mentally. Some past research
has used medical decisions (e.g., Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982), but other research has
used gain vs. loss scenarios (e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012) and computer-based tasks (Weller et
al., 2011).
In addition, previous research has found mixed results regarding age-related differences
in the framing effect. The current study found further support for no age-related differences in
susceptibility to the framing effect, similar to Rönnlund et al. (2005) and Mayhorn et al. (2002).
In terms of real life decisions, this may be an indication that people do not become more

AGE DIFFERENCES IN THE FRAMING EFFECT

53

susceptible to the framing effect as they age, a good sign for older adults. However, ways of
eliminating the framing effect (specifically in terms of mortality vs. survival) should be further
investigated.
Future Research
Future research should replicate the current study using a within-subjects design to
further validate that the framing effect is not variable across ages and instruction manipulation
conditions. Future research should also expand the older adult age range to gather data from
oldest-old adults, a potential age range that may be more or less susceptible to the framing effect.
An investigation of other types of medical decisions that pertain to a wide age range such as
diabetes or asthma care could also be conducted. Both diseases have potentially harmful
outcomes that can be limited by sufficiently treating them on a daily basis, adhering to doctors’
recommendations and treatment plans. Moreover, more research should be done to examine the
types of instructions that are given to people when they are making their decisions. Although
numeracy did not differ by age, overall, the average numeracy score was rather low. This
indicates that people are generally bad at manipulating numbers, even for simple problems,
which is an issue that should be addressed more fully in future research.
Conclusions
The current study provides further support for no age differences in demonstration of the
framing effect. Furthermore, numeracy may not be a factor that contributes to the framing effect.
Future research should include a more thorough investigation of the framing effect among other
medical decisions, specifically information regarding the short- and long-term outcomes of these
decisions, and among real-life medical decisions. Furthermore, to broaden the scope regarding
age differences in the framing effect, future research should examine cohort differences.
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics

Age

Young Adults
(N = 121)
M = 27.22 (SD = 4.69)

Middle-Aged Adults
(N = 119)
M = 47.02 (SD = 4.89)

Older Adults
(N =108)
M = 64.50 (SD = 4.22)

Gender

F (n = 64; 52.9%)

F (n = 76; 63.9%)

F (n = 54; 50%)

Marital status

Never married
(n = 63; 52.1%)

Married
(n = 58; 48.7%)

Married
(n = 61; 56.5%)

Ethnicity

Not Hispanic/Latino
(n = 107; 88.4%)

Not Hispanic/Latino
(n = 113; 95%)

Not Hispanic/Latino
(n = 100; 92.6%)

Race

White or Caucasian
(n = 95; 78.5%)

White or Caucasian
(n = 99; 83.2%)

White or Caucasian
(n = 97; 89.8%)

Time zone

Eastern
(n = 60; 49.6%)

Eastern
(n = 52; 43.7%)

Eastern
(n = 55; 50.9%)

Employment

Full time
(n =58; 47.9%)

Full time
(n = 62; 52.1%)

Fully retired
(n = 44; 40.7%)

Education

H.S. or GED
(n = 49; 40.5%)

H.S. or GED
(n = 48; 40.3%)

Bachelor's
(n = 43; 39.8%)

Income

< $10k
(n = 29; 24%)

$10k-19k
(n = 24; 20.2%)

$20k-29k
(n = 30; 27.8%)

Financial
Difficulty

A little
(n = 44; 36.4%)

A little
(n = 41; 34.5%)

No difficulty
(n = 40; 37%)
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Table 2
Data cleaning, trap questions, outliers, and multicollinearity
Steps
Situation

Remedy

1. Removal of data

Most participants removed (n
= 64) did not complete the
first questionnaire.

Removal of incomplete data.

2. Mechanical Turk ID
Matching

MTurk ID's entered at the
beginning and end of
participation were compared.
The only mismatched ID's
occurred due to an extra space
at the beginning of the ID.

Space was removed.

3. Birth years

Participants' birthyear was
collected at the beginning and
end of survey.

No mismatched birth years
were detected.

4. Scoring of trap
questions

Three trap questions were
assessed for correctness.

5. Outliers

The SPSS function of Explore
was used to assess the
presence of outliers.

Participants who correctly
answered less than 2 trap
questions were removed (n =
5)
No outliers were detected.

6. Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity of the
predictors used in the logistic
regression analyses was
examined.

No multicollinearity was
detected.

Note. N = 412 prior to cleaning data. 68 participants were removed, resulting in N = 343.
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Table 3
Correlations between measures
Age CFC

Age
CFC
GDMS:
Rational
GDMS:
Intuition
GDMS:
Dependent

1 -.043
1

GDMS:
Rational

GDMS:
GDMS:
GDMS:
GDMS: Resistance
Intuition Dependent Spontaneous Avoidant to Framing
-.068

.009

-.087

.349**

.044

-.261**

-.212**

-.176**

-.365**

.105

.120*

-.181**

.165**

.529**

.334**

.360**

.373**

-.061

-.128*

.017

-.168**

1

.605**

.525**

.578**

-.059

-.175**

.100

-.188**

1

.466**

.572**

-.147**

-.103

.135*

-.087

1

.644**

-.071

-.139**

.098

-.023

1

-.119*

-.195**

.185**

-.145**

1

-.037

-.071

.024

1

-.061

.480**

1

-.067

-.180**

Resistance
to Framing
CRT
Perceived
Decision
making
Numeracy
Note. **p < 0.01 level *p < 0.05 level

Numeracy

-.015

-.031

GDMS:
Spontaneous
GDMS:
Avoidant

Perceived
Decision
Making

-.033

-.052

1

CRT

1
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Table 4
ANOVAs for the General Decision-Making Style scale
GDMS

Age Group

Rational
Intuition
Dependent
Spontaneous
Avoidant*

2
2
2
2
2

2.830
.812
2.121
1.265
4.113

.060
.445
.122
.284
.017

Partial Eta
Squared
.017
.005
.013
.008
.024

Instruction
Condition

Rational
Intuition
Dependent
Spontaneous
Avoidant

3
3
3
3
3

.453
1.148
.392
2.061
.964

.715
.330
.759
.105
.410

.004
.010
.004
.018
.009

Age Group x
Instruction
Condition

Rational
Intuition
Dependent
Spontaneous
Avoidant

6
6
6
6
6

1.523
1.009
1.165
.277
.203

.170
.419
.325
.948
.976

.027
.018
.021
.005
.004

Note. *p < .05.

df

F

p
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Table 5
Frequencies and percentages for each decision choice by frame and instruction condition
Lung Cancer
Survival
Surgery
Deliberative
Experiential
Affective
Control

26 (60.5%)
29 (65.9%)
19 (46.3%)
29 (67.4%)

Mortality
Radiation

17 (39.5%)
15 (34.1%)
22 (53.7%)
14 (32.6%)

Surgery
14 (32.6%)
19 (44.2%)
13 (30.2%)
19 (44.2%)

Radiation
29 (67.4%)
24 (55.8%)
30 (69.8%)
24 (55.8%)

Flu

Deliberative
Experiential
Affective
Control

Positive
Vaccination Shot
Nasal Spray

Negative
Vaccination Shot
Nasal Spray

22 (50%)
25 (58.1%)
26 (61.9%)
24 (58.5%)

29 (67.4%)
30 (68.2%)
24 (57.1%)
32 (71.1%)

22 (50%)
18 (41.9%)
16 (38.1%)
17 (41.5%)

14 (32.6%)
14 (31.8%)
18 (42.9%)
13 (28.9%)
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Table 6
Frequencies and percentages for decision vignettes per age group, frame, and instruction
condition
Lung Cancer
Survival
Surgery
Radiation
Younger
Adults

Middle-Aged
Adults

Older Adults

Mortality
Surgery
Radiation

Deliberative

11 (64.7%)

6 (35.3%)

6 (42.9%)

8 (57.1%)

Experiential

10 (66.7%)

5 (33.3%)

9 (64.3%)

5 (35.7%)

Affective

8 (53.5%)

7 (46.7%)

3 (25.0%)

9 (75.0%)

Control

10 (66.7%)

5 (33.3%)

9 (56.3%)

7 (43.8%)

Deliberative

7 (53.8%)

6 (46.2%)

4 (26.7%)

11 (73.3%)

Experiential

10 (66.7%)

5 (33.3%)

6 (33.3%)

12 (66.7%)

Affective

6 (46.2%)

7 (53.8%)

7 (41.2%)

10 (58.8%)

Control
Deliberative

13 (72.2%)
8 (61.5%)

5 (27.8%)
5 (38.5%)

3 (33.3%)
4 (28.6%)

6 (66.7%)
10 (71.4%)

Experiential

9 (64.3%)

5 (35.7%)

4 (36.4%)

7 (63.6%)

Affective

4 (33.3%)

8 (66.7%)

3 (21.4%)

11 (78.6%)

Control

6 (60.0%)

4 (40.0%)

7 (38.9%)

11 (61.1%)

Flu
Positive
Vaccination
Nasal Spray
Shot
Younger
Adults

Middle-Aged
Adults

Older Adults

Negative
Vaccination
Nasal Spray
Shot

Deliberative

10 (55.6%)

8 (44.4%)

9 (64.3%)

5 (35.7%)

Experiential

9 (69.2%)

4 (30.8%)

10 (62.5%)

6 (37.5%)

Affective

8 (66.7%)

4 (33.3%)

9 (60.0%)

6 (40.0%)

Control
Deliberative

7 (50.0%)
6 (54.5%)

7 (50.0%)
5 (45.5%)

14 (82.4%)
10 (58.8%)

3 (17.6%)
7 (41.2%)

Experiential

6 (33.3%)

12 (66.7%)

10 (66.7%)

5 (33.3%)

Affective

10 (58.8%)

7 (41.2%)

6 (46.2%)

7 (53.8%)

Control
Deliberative

8 (61.5%)
6 (40.0%)

5 (38.5%)
9 (60.0%)

11 (78.6%)
10 (83.3%)

3 (21.4%)
2 (16.7%)

Experiential

10 (83.3%)

2 (16.7%)

10 (76.9%)

3 (23.1%)

Affective

8 (61.5%)

5 (38.5%)

8 (61.5%)

5 (38.5%)

Control

9 (64.3%)

5 (35.7%)

7 (50.0%)

7 (50.0%)

AGE DIFFERENCES IN THE FRAMING EFFECT

70

Table 7
Logistic regression: Lung Cancer: Age by Instruction
Condition by Frame Interaction
B

S.E.

Condition
Experiential
Affective
Control

Wald

df

p

4.332

3 .228

Odds
ratio
Middle-aged adults by

.875

.776

1.272

1 .259

2.400

-.811

.858

.893

1 .345

.444

.539

.739

.532

1 .466

1.714

1.000

2 .607

Age Groups

B

Survival frame
Older adults by Survival
frame

-.724

.795

.828

1 .363

.485

Middle-aged adults by

Older adults

-.629

.801

.616

1 .433

.533

Experiential

.894

.741

1.455

1 .228

2.444

Age Groups by Frame by

2.978

Condition
Middle-aged adults by
Survival by Experiential
Middle-aged adults by
Survival by Affective
Middle-aged adults by
Survival frame by Control
Older adults by Survival
frame by Experiential
Older adults by Survival
frame by Affective
Older adults by Survival
frame by Control
Age Groups by Frame

1.009

1.536

.431

Affective

6 .812
1 .511

Middle-aged adults by
Middle-aged adults by

2.743

Control
Older adults by

-1.302

1.570

.687

1 .407

.272

.935

1.591

.345

1 .557

2.547

.550

1.594

.119

1 .730

1.733

Experiential
Older adults by Affective
Older adults by Control

Experiential
-1.118

1.654

.457

1 .499

.327

-.077

1.558

.002

1 .961

.926

.201

2 .904

Survival frame by
Affective
Survival frame by Control

df

p

Odds
ratio

1.095

.062

1 .804

1.312

.492

1.106

.198

1 .656

1.636

3.919

6 .688

-.557

1.093

.260

1 .610

.573

1.466

1.149

1.628

1 .202

4.331

-.221

1.178

.035

1 .851

.802

-.519

1.160

.200

1 .655

.595

.428

1.229

.121

1 .728

1.534

-.075

1.063

.005

1 .944

.928

1.148

3 .766

Frame by Condition
Survival frame by

Wald

.272

Age Groups by Condition

Middle-aged adults
Survival frame

S.E.

-.788

1.077

.536

1 .464

.455

.338

1.123

.091

1 .763

1.403

-.452

1.050

.185

1 .667

.636
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Table 8
Lung Cancer with Numeracy as a Covariate: Age by Instruction
Condition by Frame Interaction
B

S.E.

Wald

df

p

B

Odds

S.E.

Wald

df

p

ratio

ratio
Numeracy

.005

.057

Age Groups

1 .936 1.005

Older adults by Survival frame

1.001

2 .606

by Affective

.006

Middle-aged adults

-.723

.795

.827

1 .363

.485

Older adults by Survival frame

Older adults

-.631

.802

.620

1 .431

.532

by Control

Survival frame

1 .227 2.449

Age Groups by Frame

3 .230

Middle-aged adults by

.776 1.272

1 .259 2.400

Survival frame

-.808

.859

.885

1 .347

Older adults by Survival frame

.538

.739

.530

1 .466 1.713

.896

.741 1.459

Condition
Experiential
Affective
Control

4.305
.875

2.969

Condition
Survival frame by Experiential
Middle-aged adults by
Survival frame by Affective
Middle-aged adults by
Survival frame by Control
Older adults by Survival frame
by Experiential

6 .813

Experiential
Middle-aged adults by

1.006 1.537

.428

1 .513 2.734

-1.303 1.570

.689

1 .407

.932 1.591

.343

1 .558 2.541

.541 1.597

.115

1 .735 1.718

.272

-1.124 1.655

.461

1 .497

.325

-.077 1.558

.002

1 .961

.926

.203

2 .903

.271 1.095

.061

1 .805 1.311

.497 1.108

.201

1 .654 1.643

Age Groups by Condition
Middle-aged adults by

Age Groups by Frame by
Middle-aged adults by

.446

Odds

-.558 1.093

3.925

6 .687

.261

1 .609

.572

1.469 1.149 1.633

1 .201 4.344

Middle-aged adults by Control

-.219 1.178

.035

1 .852

.803

Older adults by Experiential

-.518 1.160

.199

1 .655

.596

.429 1.229

.122

1 .727 1.536

-.075 1.063

.005

1 .943

1.131

3 .770

-.784 1.078

.529

1 .467

.336 1.124

.089

1 .765 1.399

-.452 1.050

.185

1 .667

Affective

Older adults by Affective
Older adults by Control
Frame by Condition
Survival frame by Experiential
Survival frame by Affective
Survival frame by Control

.927
.456
.637
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Table 9
Logistic regression: Flu: Age by Instruction Condition by Frame
Interaction
B

S.E.

Wald

df

p

B

Odds

S.E.

Wald

df

p

ratio

ratio
Age Groups

1.897

2

.387

Middle-aged adults by No

.231

.744

.096

1

.756 1.260

flu frame

Older adults

-1.022

.955

1.146

1

.284

Older adults by No flu

No flu frame

.365

.732

.248

1

.618 1.440

frame

2.232

3

.526

Age Groups by Condition

Middle-aged adults

Condition

.360

Experiential

.077

.760

.010

1

.919 1.080

Middle-aged adults by

Affective

.182

.767

.056

1

.812 1.200

Experiential

-.953

.846

1.268

1

.260

Middle-aged adults by

Control

.386

Affective

Age Groups by Condition

9.474

by Frame

6

.149

Middle-aged adults by
Control

Middle-aged adults by
Experiential by No flu

1.877

1.524

1.516

1

.218 6.532

Middle-aged adults by
Affective by No flu frame
Middle-aged adults by
Control by No flu frame

Older adults by Affective
-.033

1.533

.000

1

.983

Older adults by Control
-.521

1.608

.105

1

.746

.594

1.754

1.002

1

.317

.173

frame
Older adults by Affective
by No flu frame
Older adults by Control by
No flu frame
Age Groups by Frame

-1.363

1.648

.683

-3.778

1.644

1

.408

.256

5.285

1 .022*

.023

2.633

2

.268

1.189

1.926

1

.165 5.208

7.200

6

.303

-.413

1.059

.153

1

.696

.329

1.068

.095

1

.758 1.389

.010

1.176

.000

1

.993 1.010

.329

1.269

.067

1

.796 1.389

.957

1.230

.605

1

.437 2.604

2.562

1.266

4.099

1 .043*

3.338

3

.342

Condition by Frame
Experiential by No flu

-1.756

1.650

.968

Older adults by
Experiential by No flu

Older adults by
Experiential

frame

Odds

.661

12.96
3

-.665

1.079

.380

1

.538

.514

Affective by No flu frame

-.652

1.090

.358

1

.550

.521

Control by No flu frame

1.176

1.108

1.127

1

.288 3.241

frame

Note. *p < .05
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Table 10
Logistic regression: Flu with Numeracy as a Covariate: Age by
Instruction Condition by Frame Interaction
B

S.E.

Wald

df

p

Odds

B

S.E.

Wald

df

p

ratio
.002

.057

Age Groups
Middle-aged adults

.002

1

.967

1.898

2

.387

1.002

ratio
Older adults by Control by
No flu frame

.231

.744

.096

1

.756

1.260

Older adults

-1.022

.955

1.147

1

.284

.360

No flu frame

.366

.733

.249

1

.617

1.442

2.233

3

.525

Condition

Age Groups by Frame
Middle-aged adults by No
flu frame
Older adults by No flu

Experiential

.077

.760

.010

1

.919

1.081

frame

Affective

.183

.768

.057

1

.811

1.201

Age Groups by Condition

-.953

.846

1.269

1

.260

.386

Control
Age Groups by Condition

9.475

by Frame

6

.149

Middle-aged adults by
Affective

1.873

1.527

1.506

1

.220

6.509

frame
Middle-aged adults by
Affective by No flu frame
Middle-aged adults by
Control by No flu frame

-.032

1.533

.000

1

.983

.968

-.525

1.610

.106

1

.745

.592

by No flu frame

Older adults by
Experiential
Older adults by Affective
Older adults by Control

-1.758

1.755

1.004

1

.316

.172

Experiential by No flu

1.649

.685

1

.408

.256

2

.268

1.071

.031

1

.860

.827

1.651

1.189

1.928

1

.165

5.214

7.199

6

.303

-.414

1.059

.153

1

.696

.661

.329

1.068

.095

1

.758

1.389

.011

1.176

.000

1

.992

1.011

.328

1.269

.067

1

.796

1.389

.957

1.230

.605

1

.437

2.604

2.564

1.266

4.100

1 .043* 12.985

3.335

3

.343

-.663

1.080

.377

1

.539

.515

Affective by No flu frame

-.652

1.090

.358

1

.550

.521

Control by No flu frame

1.176

1.108

1.128

1

.288

3.243

frame
-1.364

2.634
-.189

Condition by Frame

frame
Older adults by Affective

Middle-aged adults by
Control

Older adults by
Experiential by No flu

Middle-aged adults by
Experiential

Middle-aged adults by
Experiential by No flu

Odds
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Table 11
Logistic regression: Numeracy and frame for lung cancer vignette
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Odds
ratio
Numeracy
-.016 .081 .038
1 .845
.984
Survival frame
.631 .952 .440
1 .507
1.880
Survival frame
.033 .107 .094
1 .760
1.033
by Numeracy
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Table 12
Logistic regression: Numeracy and frame for flu vignette
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Odds
ratio
Numeracy
-.063 .090 .479
1 .489
.939
No flu frame
-.481 1.001 .231
1 .631
.618
No flu frame by
.100 .112 .784
1 .376
1.105
Numeracy
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Gain or Loss Frame

Cognitive
Pragmatics
(Experiential)

Emotion
(Affective)

Age
Differences

Individual Differences
Immediate Context
Sociocultural & Historical Context
Figure 1. Three dimensional decision-making framework adapted from Strough, Karns, and
Schlosnagle (2011) for this study.

Healthcare Availability

Cognitive
Mechanics
(Deliberative)
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Short- or Long-term
Information

Economic Recession
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= Young adults
= Older adults
Young Adults

Deliberative
System

Middle-Aged
Adults

Experiential
System

Older Adults

Affective System

Young Adults

Deliberative
System

Middle-Aged
Adults

Experiential
System

Older Adults

Affective System

Framing Effect

No Framing Effect

Figure 2. Pictorial representation of hypothesized age differences in the framing effect by
processing system.
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Appendix A
Instruction Manipulation and Framing Vignettes (McNeil et al., 1982)

Cancer Scenario
[Deliberative instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and reasoning
based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page.]
[Affective instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial reactions and
gut feelings to make your decision on the following page.]
[Experiential instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the
following page.]
[Control instructions: Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you
normally would.]
The following contains specific information about cancer treatments at several area hospitals.
Each hospital has its own doctors and policies regarding patient care, approaches to treatment,
and different survival rates for the various types of treatment. For each hospital, please indicate
whether you prefer surgery or radiation therapy. Below are general descriptions of the
treatments.
Surgery for lung cancer involves an operation on the lungs. Most patients are in the hospital for
two to three weeks and have some pain around their incisions; they spend a month or so
recuperating at home. After that they generally feel fine.
Radiations therapy for lung cancer involves the use of radiation to kill the tumor and requires
coming to the hospital about four times a week for 6 weeks. Each treatment takes a few minutes,
and during the treatment patients lie on a table as if they were having an x-ray. During the course
of treatment, some patients develop nausea and vomiting, but by the end of 6 weeks they
generally feel fine.
Thus, after the initial 6 weeks, patients treated with either surgery or radiation therapy feel about
the same.
[Deliberative instructions: Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers
presented in the scenarios to make your decision.]
[Affective instructions: Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your
decision.]
[Experiential instructions: Please use only your previous experiences and those of others to
make your decision.]
[Control instructions: Please make your decision as you normally would.]
[Survival]
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Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 77 patients live for more than 1 year, and 23 patients
live for more than 5 years.
Of 100 patients having surgery, 68 patients live for more than 1 year, and 32 patients live for
more than 5 years.
[Mortality]
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 23 patients die by 1 year and 77 patients die by 5 years.
Of 100 patients having surgery, 32 patients die by 1 year and 68 patients die by 5 years.

Would you choose radiation or surgery?

Flu Vaccination Scenario
[Deliberative instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and reasoning
based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page.]
[Affective instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial reactions and
gut feelings to make your decision on the following page.]
[Experiential instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the
following page.]
[Control instructions: Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you
normally would.]
The following contains specific information about vaccinations for a new flu given at several
area medical centers. Each medical center has its own doctors and policies regarding patient care,
approaches to treatment, and different rates of getting the new flu. For each medical center,
please indicate whether you prefer a vaccination shot or a nasal spray vaccination. Below are
general descriptions of the vaccinations.
The vaccination shot involves a shot given in the arm. Most patients spend about 30 minutes to
an hour in the medical center office and have minimal pain around the area of the shot. No
recuperation time is necessary in most cases, though some individuals may feel slightly ill for the
duration of the day. After that they generally feel fine.
The nasal spray vaccination involves a spray which patients must inhale into their nose. Most
patients spend about an hour to an hour and a half in the medical center office and have minimal
pain regarding the nasal spray, though a burning sensation in the nasal cavity may occur. No
recuperation time is necessary in most cases, though the patients must stay in the medical center
office for a period of a half an hour due to possible dizziness from the nasal spray. After this
initial dizziness, they generally feel fine.
Thus, after the initial day of the shot or nasal spray, patients treated with either feel about the
same.
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[Deliberative instructions: Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers
presented in the scenarios to make your decision.]
[Affective instructions: Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your
decision.]
[Experiential instructions: Please use only your previous experiences and those of others to
make your decision.]
[Control instructions: Please make your decision as you normally would.]
[Negative]
Of 100 patients who had the vaccination shot, 23 got the new flu within month 1 and 77 got the
new flu within 6 months.
Of 100 patients who had the nasal spray vaccination, 32 got the new flu within month 1 and 68
got the new flu within 6 months.
[Positive]
Of 100 patients who had the vaccination shot, 77 did not get the new flu within 1 month and 23
did not get the new flu within 6 months.
Of 100 patients who had the nasal spray vaccination, 68 did not get the new flu within 1 month
and 32 did not get the new flu within 6 months.

Would you choose the vaccination shot or nasal spray?
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Appendix B
Demographics Questionnaire
Are you 18 years of age or older?
 Yes
 No
Please enter your MTurk ID.
______________________
Please indicate your sex:
 Male
 Female
 Other
Please indicate your marital status:
 Never married
 Married
 Not married
 Not married, but living together
 Widow/widower
 Divorced
 Other (please specify) ____________________
Please indicate your age (in years; e.g. "22"):
______________________
Please indicate your ethnicity:
o Hispanic or Latino
o Not Hispanic or Latino
o Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your race:
o White or Caucasian
o Black of African American
o Asian
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
o Biracial or Multi-racial
o Other
o Prefer not to answer
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Please select your time zone.
 Eastern
 Central
 Mountain
 Pacific
 Hawaiian
 Alaskan
What is your current employment status?
 Employed full time
 Employed part time
 Partially retired (i.e., retired, but working part time)
 Fully retired (i.e., no longer working)
 Unemployed
 Other (please specify) ____________________
Please indicate your highest education:
 High school diploma or GED
 Associate's degree
 Bachelor's degree
 Master's degree
 Doctoral degree
If you are a full-time student, how long have you been enrolled (i.e., college or a degreeawarding program) (e.g., 3 years)?
__________________________________

If you are currently a college student, please indicate your class status:
 Freshman/1st year
 Sophomore/2nd year
 Junior/3rd year
 Senior/4th year
 Graduate student
 Other (please specify) ____________________
If you are a college graduate (or currently enrolled in college), please indicate your major:
___________________________________________________
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If you are a college student, please indicate your GPA:
___________________________________________________
How much financial difficulty do you have paying your bills?
 No difficulty
 A little difficulty
 Some difficulty
 A great deal of difficulty
Please estimate your gross income from the past 12 months (including wages, social security
earnings, tips, etc.).
 Less than $10,000
 $10,000-$19,000
 $20,000-$29,000
 $30,000-$39,000
 $40,000-$49,000
 $50,000-$59,000
 $60,000-$69,000
 $70,000 or more
 I don't know.
If you are working, please indicate your current or former occupation. If you are a full-time
student, please write student. If you are retired, please write retired.
___________________________________________________
If you are working, how long have you spent at this occupation (e.g., 10 years)?
___________________________________________________
In the past 5 years, how much experience have you had making medical decisions for yourself or
others?
 1 No experience
 2
 3
 4
 5 Much experience
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How much training do you have in economic principles?
 1 No training
 2
 3
 4
 5 A lot of training
How much experience do you have with the flu?
 1 No Experience
 2
 3
 4
 5 Much experience
How much experience do you have with lung cancer?
 1 No experience
 2
 3
 4
 5 Much experience
Please indicate your birth year (e.g., 1977):
______________________

As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions is:
 Better
 The Same
 Not as Good
As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions about things that affect other people is:
 Better
 The Same
 Not as Good
As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions about things that affect only me is:
 Better
 The Same
 Not as Good
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Appendix C
General Decision-Making Styles
(Scott & Bruce, 1995)

Instructions: Listed below are statements describing how individuals go about making important
decisions. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.
5 point scale; 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree
Rational
1. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making
decisions.
2. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way.
3. My decision making requires careful thought.
4. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specific goal.
Intuition
5. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts.
6. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition.
7. I generally make decisions that feel right to me.
8. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than to
have a rational reason for it.
9. When I make a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions.
Dependent
10. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions.
11. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people.
12. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions.
13. I use the advice of other people in making my important decisions.
14. I like to have someone to steer me in the right direction when I am faced with important
decisions.
Avoidant
15. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on.
16. I postpone decision making whenever possible.
17. I often procrastinate when it comes to making important decisions.
18. I generally make important decisions at the last minute.
19. I put off making many decisions because thinking about them makes me uneasy.
Spontaneous
20. I generally make snap decisions.
21. I often make decisions on the spur of the moment
22. I make quick decisions.
23. I often make impulsive decisions.
24. When making decisions, I do what seems natural at the moment.
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Appendix D
Numeracy
(Lipkus et al., 2001)
The following questions concern the general concepts of number and probability. To the best of
your ability, please write down your answer to each question. In case you do try to figure out but
you still do not know an answer for a particular question, you may specify “I don’t know.”

1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die, 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?
Your answer:

2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?
Your answer:

3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
Your answer:

4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please
circle only one choice that best represents your answer.
a.
1 in 100

b.
1 in 1,000

c.
1 in 10

5. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please circle only
one choice that best represents your answer.
a.

b.

c.
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6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double
that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
Your answer:
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s risk is
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
Your answer:

8. If a chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the
disease out of 100?
Your answer:

9. If a chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the
disease out of 1,000?
Your answer:
10. If a chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a
__________% chance of getting disease.
Your answer:

11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005 out of 10,000 people, about how many of
them are expected to get infected?
Your answer:
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Appendix E
Resistance to Framing: Attribute Framing
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007)
INSTRUCTIONS: Each of the following problems ask you to rate your judgment of a product or
a situation. Each problem is presented with a scale ranging from 1 (representing one option)
through 6 (representing the other option). For each problem, please choose the number on the
scale that best reflects your judgment. Some items may seem similar. Answer each item with
your judgment of the product or situation.
Because of changes in tax laws, you may get back as much as $1200 in income tax. Your
accountant has been exploring alternative ways to take advantage of this situation. He has
developed two plans: If Plan A is adopted, you will lose $800 of the possible $1200. If Plan B
is adopted, you have a 33% chance of losing none of the money, and a 67% chance of losing all
$1200. Which plan would you use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that recent evidence has shown that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200
endangered animals. Two response options have been suggested: If Option A is used, 600
animals will be lost for sure. If Option B is used, there is a 75% chance that 400 animals will be
lost, and a 25% chance that 1,200 animals will be lost. Which option do you recommend to use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
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Imagine that your doctor tells you that you have a cancer that must be treated. Your choices are
as follows:
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery, 90 live through the operation, and 34 are alive at the end
of five years.
Radiation therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, all live through the treatment, and 22
are alive at the end of five years. Which treatment would you choose?
 1 Definitely would choose surgery
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose radiation
Imagine that your client has $6,000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is
occurring. You have two investment strategies that you can recommend under the existing
circumstances to preserve your client’s capital. If strategy A is followed, $2,000 of your client’s
investment will be saved. If strategy B is followed, there is a 33% chance that the entire $6,000
will be saved, and a 67% chance that none of the principal will be saved. Which of these two
strategies would you favor?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that recent evidence has shown that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200
endangered animals. Two response options have been suggested: If Option A is used, 600
animals will be saved for sure. If Option B is used, there is a 75% chance that 800 animals will
be saved, and a 25% chance that no animals will be saved. Which option do you recommend to
use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
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Imagine that in one particular state it is projected that 1000 students will drop out of school
during the next year. Two programs have been proposed to address this problem, but only one
can be implemented. Based on other states’ experiences with the programs, estimates of the
outcomes that can be expected from each program can be made. Assume for purposes of this
decision that these estimates of the outcomes are accurate and are as follows: If Program A is
adopted, 400 of the 1000 students will stay in school. If Program B is adopted, there is a 40%
chance that all 1000 students will stay in school and 60% chance that none of the 1000 students
will stay in school. Which program would you favor for implementation?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that your doctor tells you that you have a cancer that must be treated. Your choices are
as follows:
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery, 10 die because of the operation, and 66 die by the end
of five years.
Radiation therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during the treatment, and
78 die by the end of five years. Which treatment would you choose?
 1 Definitely would choose surgery
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose radiation
Imagine a hospital is treating 32 injured soldiers, who are all expected to lose one leg. There are
two doctors that can help the soldiers, but only one can be hired: If Doctor A is hired, 20 soldiers
will keep both legs. If Doctor B is hired, there is a 63% chance that all soldiers keep both legs
and a 37% chance that nobody will save both legs. Which doctor do you recommend?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program
A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a 33% chance that 600
people will be saved, and a 67% chance that no people will be saved. Which program do you
recommend to use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that your client has $6,000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is
occurring. You have two investment strategies that you can recommend under the existing
circumstances to preserve your client’s capital. If strategy A is followed, $4,000 of your client’s
investment will be lost. If strategy B is followed, there is a 33% chance that the nothing will be
lost, and a 67% chance that $6,000 will be lost. Which of these two strategies would you favor?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that in one particular state it is projected that 1000 students will drop out of school
during the next year. Two programs have been proposed to address this problem, but only one
can be implemented. Based on other states’ experiences with the programs, estimates of the
outcomes that can be expected from each program can be made. Assume for purposes of this
decision that these estimates of the outcomes are accurate and are as follows: If Program A is
adopted, 600 of the 1000 students will drop out of school. If Program B is adopted, there is a
40% chance that none of the 1000 students will drop out of school and 60% chance that all 1000
students will drop out of school. Which program would you favor for implementation?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
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Because of changes in tax laws, you may get back as much as $1200 in income tax. Your
accountant has been exploring alternative ways to take advantage of this situation. He has
developed two plans: If Plan A is adopted, you will get back $400 of the possible $1200. If Plan
B is adopted, you have a 33% chance of getting back all $1200, and a 67% chance of getting
back no money. Which plan would you use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program
A is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, there is a 33% chance that nobody
will die, and a 67% chance that 600 people will die. Which program do you recommend to
use?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
Imagine a hospital is treating 32 injured soldiers, who are all expected to lose one leg. There are
two doctors that can help the soldiers, but only one can be hired: If Doctor A is hired, 12 soldiers
will lose one leg. If Doctor B is hired, there is a 63% chance that nobody loses a leg and a 37%
chance that all lose a leg. Which doctor do you recommend?
 1 Definitely would choose A
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6 Definitely would choose B
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Appendix F
Consideration of Future Consequences
(Strathman et al., 1994)
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of
you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) please write a "1"
to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you)
please write a "5" next to the question. And, of course, use the numbers in the middle if you fall
between the extremes. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements
below.
1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic
1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to
day behavior.
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for
many years.
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself.
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes
of my actions.
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take.
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future
outcomes.
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative
outcome will not occur for many years.
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences than a
behavior with less-important immediate consequences.
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will
be resolved before they reach crisis level.
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at
a later time.
11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems that
may occur at a later date.
12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior
that has distant outcomes.
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Appendix G
Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick, 2005)
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
_______ cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines
to make 100 widgets?
_______ minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake?
________ days
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Appendix H
Manipulation Check & Short- vs. Long-Term Information Questions
Manipulation Check:
To what extent did you use logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers in the decision
situation to make your decision?
 1 Not at all
 2
 3
 4
 5 A great deal
To what extent did you use your gut feelings and initial reactions to make your decision?
 1 Not at all
 2
 3
 4
 5 A great deal
To what extent did you use your previous experiences or those of others to make your decision?
 1 Not at all
 2
 3
 4
 5 A great deal
Short- vs. Long-term Information:
How important was the short-term information (i.e., the number of people who got the flu or did
not get the flu within 1 month) to you in your decision making?
 1 Not at all important
 2
 3
 4
 5 Very important
How important was the long-term information (i.e., the number of people who got the flu or did
not get the flu within 6 months) to you in your decision making?
 1 Not at all important
 2
 3
 4
 5 Very important
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Appendix I
Logistic Regression Models for Individual Predictors
Instruction Condition
Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed with frame (survival vs. mortality)
and instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and
decision choice (surgery or radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model
was significant, χ2(7, N = 342) = 25.27, p = .001 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R
Square, 8.2%), indicating that the model significantly distinguished between participants who
indicated they would choose surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation.
The model correctly classified 62.1% of cases. Frame was a significant predictor of decision
outcome with an odds ratio of 3.17 (see Table 1a). This indicates that participants who were in
the survival condition were over 3 times as likely to indicate that they would choose surgery over
radiation as participants in the mortality frame. Instruction condition and the interaction between
instruction condition and frame were not significant predictors of decision choice (see Table 1a
below).
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Table 1a
Logistic regression: Lung cancer: Frame and Instruction Condition
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Odds
Ratio
Survival frame 1.153 .451 6.544
1 .011 3.168
Deliberative
3.017
3 .389
Experiential
.495 .447 1.222
1 .269 1.640
Affective
-.108 .465 .054
1 .816
.898
Control
.495 .447 1.222
1 .269 1.640
Frame by
.534
3 .911
Condition
Survival frame
-.260 .631 .170
1 .680
.771
by Experiential
Survival frame
-.463 .642 .522
1 .470
.629
by Affective
Survival frame
-.191 .635 .091
1 .763
.826
by Control

Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu) and
instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and decision
choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. The full model was
not significant, χ2(7, N = 344) = 6.41, p = .49 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R
Square, 8.2%). The model correctly classified 61.6% of cases. Frame, instruction condition, and
the interaction were not significant predictors of decision outcome (see Table 1b).
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Table 1b
Logistic regression: Flu: Frame and Instruction Condition
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Odds
ratio
Deliberative
2.105
3 .551
Experiential
-.034 .459 .005
1 .941
.967
Affective
.441 .451 .955
1 .328 1.554
Control
-.173 .463 .139
1 .709
.842
No flu frame
.728 .444 2.694
1 .101 2.071
Condition by
2.464
3 .482
Frame
Experiential by
-.295 .630 .219
1 .640
.745
No flu frame
Affective by No
-.926 .628 2.171
1 .141
.396
flu frame
Control by No
-.172 .637 .073
1 .787
.842
flu frame

Age Differences
Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed with frame (survival vs. mortality)
and age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults) as predictors and decision choice (surgery or
radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model was significant, χ2(5, N =
342) = 21.61, p < .001 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R Square, 8.2%), indicating
that the model significantly distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose
surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly
classified 61.2% of cases. However, neither frame nor age was a significant predictor of decision
outcome (see Table 2a).
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Table 2a
Logistic regression: Lung cancer: Age and Frame
B
S.E. Wald df
p
Age Groups
Middle-aged
adults
Older adults
Survival frame
Age Groups by
Frame
Middle-aged
adults by
Survival frame
Older adults by
Survival frame

Odds
ratio

3.855

2 .146

-.596 .384 2.417

1 .120

.551

-.702 .391 3.224
.600 .375 2.556

1 .073
1 .110

.496
1.821

.994

2 .608

.516 .536

.927

1 .336

1.676

.378 .552

.471

1 .493

1.460

Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu), age
(younger, middle-aged, and older adults) as predictors and decision choice (vaccination shot or
nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ2(5, N = 343)
= 4.68, p = .46. The model explained between 1.4% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 1.8%
(Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in decision outcome and correctly classified 61.5% of
cases. However, neither frame nor age was a significant predictor of decision outcome (see Table
2b).
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Table 2b
Logistic regression: Flu: Age and Frame
B
S.E. Wald df
Age Groups
Middle-aged
adults
Older adults
No flu frame
Age Groups by
Frame
Middle-aged
adults by No flu
frame
Older adults by
No flu frame

p

Odds
ratio

.406

2 .816

.222 .382

.337

1 .562

1.249

.020 .402
.351 .383

.002
.840

1 .961
1 .359

1.020
1.421

.158

2 .924

.135 .536

.063

1 .801

1.144

-.081 .559

.021

1 .885

.922

